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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines political and administrative 
controls over federal government contracting. More 
specifically, it addresses itself to a consideration of 
the objectives, problems and sources of control relevant to 
goods and construction procurement. 
The objectives of control are threefold: the 
attainment of fair value, the achievement of equity and 
the promotion of socio-economic goals compatible with 
traditional procurement standards. The problems of 
control, expressed in terms of the objectives, are cost 
control, the maintenance of fairness and justice in the 
procurement process, and the achievement of consistency 
between socio-economic goals and the procurement function 
of government. The sources of control include parliamentary, 
executive, administrative, legal and judicial control 
mechanisms. These controls are considered in the context 
of their ability to affect the procedures and substance of 
government contracting and thereby to deal with contractual 
problems that impede the attainment of the objectives of 
control. 
The analysis shows that the objectives of control 
have all too often been frustrated and undermined. There 
seem to be too many problems and too few effective sources 
of control to maintain that political and administrative 
control over government contracting is adequate. Possible 
solutions to some of these problems are suggested. 
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A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
In the preparation of this study, every effort has 
been made to ensure that the resources used are up to date. 
To this end, the study relies heavily on current primary 
sources and data obtained through interviews with civil 
servants in various departments of government. It should 
also be noted that much of the information contained in this 
study has been reviewed for substance by a government 
procurement official, who has asked that he remain 
anonymous. 
x 
PREFACE 
This thesis will examine the exercise of political 
and administrative control over federal government contracting1 
in Canada. The major proposition to be examined is that 
political and administrative control and influence over 
federal government contracting are inadequate to achieve 
certain principles relating to the conduct of Canadian 
governmental affairs in the area of procurement. The 
principles referred to maintain that: 
1) the government should obtain fair value for the taxpayer's 
dollar; 
2) the government should be equitable in the dispensation 
of public funds; and 
3) the government should, when appropriate, relate its 
procurement activities to national policies and objectives. 
1 The, words contracting and procurement both have 
distinct meanings. Contracting means to engage in a legally 
binding agreement and procurement means to obtain or secure. 
The emphasis of this study requires that these two terms be 
used interchangeably. It is therefore necessary to stipulate 
the context in which these words will be used. 
This study is concerned not only with government 
procurement, but also with the formal instruments applied 
thereto. Consequently, when the term contracting is used 
it should be taken to mean contracting for the purpose of 
government procurement. Similarly, when the term procurement 
is used it refers to procurement by means of formal agreement 
or contract. Therefore, this study does not deal with such 
things as subsidy, revenue, venture or employment contracts. 
.' 
This study shall endeavour to show the need for improved 
political and administrative control over government 
contracting in the context of achieving these principles. 
xi 
The first chapter is intended as a general 
introduction to the subject of federal government contracting 
in Canada. It will contain a description of the federal 
government institutions relevant to the conduct of 
contracting, as well as a description of the various types 
of contract with which the government is involved. It should 
be noted in this regard that this study will focus primarily 
on two types of contract - namely, goods and construction 
contracts. The first chapter will also deal briefly with the 
present trends in Canadian government procurement. This will 
be done by examining the growth, economic significance and 
complexity of the government procurement function. 
The second chapter will discuss the objectives 
underlying the exercise of control over government contracting. 
It will also undertake to define what is meant by the word 
control and to make a distinction between the words control, 
authority and influence as they pertain to this study. 
The third chapter will examine certain major problems 
in government contracting which act to hinder the attainment 
of the objectives discussed in Chapter II and thereby reduce 
effective control over gove~nment procurement by the government 
departments and agencies concerned. It will be the purpose 
of this chapter to provide a basis for a consideration in 
subsequent chapters of the sources of control and an 
xii 
evaluation of the role they playas instruments of control. 
Chapters IV through VII will deal with the sources of 
control over federal government contracting. Chapter IV 
will deal with parliamentary controls, Chapter V with 
executive controls, Chapter VI with administrative controls 
and Chapter VII with legal and judicial forms of control. 
These chapters will discuss how the various sources of 
control affect the procedure and substance of contracting, 
in addition to considering the extent to which those who 
exercise control are able to help remove obstacles which 
impede the exercise of control over government contracting. 
These chapters will also attempt to draw some conclusions 
as to what can be done to improve the exercise of control 
over federal government contracting in Canada. 
The final chapter, Chapter VIII, will contain a 
summary of some of the major problems within the procurement 
system and an assessment of the extent to which the 
objectives of control - fair value, equity and the promotion 
of national goals - have been met. 
I would like to thank a number of individuals for 
their help in the preparation of this study. Of particular 
note is my thesis supervisor, W. D. K. Kernaghan, who 
diligently devoted himself to his student. His guidance 
in the development of this study was much appreciated, as 
were his criticisms and suggestions. I would also like to 
express my gratitude to C. Baar and T. Carroll. Their 
comments and criticisms were warmly welcomed. 
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Special thanks are also due S. Fyfe , A. Macintyre 
and a number of confidential sources for their valued 
contributions. And finally, I would like to express my 
indebtedness to H. R. Balls for having kindled my interest 
in the subject of federal government contracting. 
PART 1 
INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES 
AND PROBLEMS 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
It is often the case that detail clouds the 
identification of salient issues. This study hopes to avoid 
this problem by providing some perspective on the forest 
before advancing to a consideration of the trees and 
underbrush. To this end, this chapter will provide some 
general background on the subject at hand - Canadian federal 
government contracting. This chapter will first provide an 
introduction to those federal government institutions most 
relevant to the conduct of government contracting. It will 
then describe the various types of contract with which the 
government is involved and identify those upon which this 
study will focus. And finally, it will examine briefly the 
present trends in Canadian government procurement. It will 
do so in terms of examining the growth of government procure-
ment, its economic significance and its complexity. 
The task of discovering those federal government 
institutions most relevant 'to the conduct of government 
contracting is no easy matter. All departments and agencies 
in the Canadian government are involved to some extent in 
contracting. Certain of them are clearly more important 
than others. The best way to indicate the importance of the 
Rank 
Order 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
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TABLE 1 
Rank Order of Government Departments 
Based on Estimated2 Dollar Value 
of Contracts (all types) 
Government Department 
National Defence 
Public Works 
Transport 
Estimated Dollar 
Value of· Contracts 
Indian Affairs & Northern Development 
Manpower and Immigration 
1,148,170,151 
533,753,288 
358,308,864 
337,453,581 
325,005,730 
234,658,246 
194,812,338 
189,887,637 
Post Office 
Solicitor General 
Environment 
Secretary of State 
National Health and Welfare 
External Affairs 
National Revenue 
Agriculture 
veterans Affairs 
InQuiJtry,. Trade and Commerce 
Energy, Mines and Resources 
Supply and Services 
Communications 
Science and Technology 
Regional Economic Expansion 
Consumer and Corporate Affairs 
Urban Affairs 
Privy Council 
Parliament 
Labour 
Finance 
Justice 
Treasury Board 
Governor General and Lieutenant 
Governors 
90,792,447 
88,292,241 
85,903,016 
69,866,812 
68,525,806 
67,105,643 
50,811,844 
46,759,324 
42,805,305 
37,252,775 
36,585,949 
27,373,265 
15,054,439 
12,076,538 
9,760,589 
9,234,681 
8,710,430 
7,941,270 
7,878,564 
7,160,796 
391,580 
2These figures represent calculations dORe in accordance 
with Treasury Board methods for estimating procurement costs, 
as related byA. Macintyre, Group Chief Contracts Policy, 
Treasury Board, Government of Canada, Ottawa, July, 1976. 
These calculations are based upon columns 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
and 9 of the Public Accounts object of expenditure tables. 
See - Government of Canada, Public Accounts of Cana.da 1976, 
Vol. 1, pp. 6.34-6.35. 
4 
various federal institutions to government contracting is to 
rank them according to the dollar value of the contracting 
that they undertake. Table 1 provides such a ranking for 
29 government departments based on the estimated dollar volume 
of their contractual activities. 
The data in Table 1 indicates that eight government 
departments engage in contractual activities that have a 
total value of more than one hundred million dollars. These 
eight departments, when taken together, account for over 80%3 
of the estimated total value of all Canadian federal government 
contracts. The individual breakdown among these eight is 
shown in Table 2 below. 4 
TABLE 2 
Percentage of Total Estimated Contractual 
Activity by Department 
Department 
Department of National Defence 
Department of Public Works 
Department of Transport 
Department of Indian Affairs & Northern 
Development 
Department of Manpower and Immigration 
Post Office Depar,t:ment 
Department of the Solicitor General 
Department of the Environment 
Total 
Percentage of 
Total Estimated 
Contractual 
Activity 
27.9% 
13.0% 
8.7% 
8.2% 
7.9% 
5.7% 
4.7% 
4.6% 
,81)."1% 
3The figure of 80% was derived from information in 
Table 1 and from other data contained in the Public Accounts 
of Canada. 
4Ibid • 
5 
The figures in Table 2 give some indication of the 
importance of these eight departments to government 
contracting. It is interesting to note that the Department 
of National Defence and the Department of Public Works, when 
taken together, account for over 40% of the estimated 
contractual activity of the federal government. Although 
these two departments dominate in an overall sense, their 
importance is not necessarily felt in all areas of government 
contract expenditure. Table 3 gives some indication of the 
importance of various government departments to selected 
areas of contractual expenditure based upon the estimated 
dollar value of such expenditure. 
The figures in Table 3 show the predominance of the 
Departments of National Defence, Public Works and Transport 
in many, if not most, of the various areas of contract 
expenditure. By comparison the other departments tend to 
concentrate a substantial portion of their contractual 
expenditures in only one or two areas. For instance, 
professional and special services contribute 90%5 of the 
estimated dollar value of all contractual activity undertaken 
by the Department of Manpower and Immigration. Similarly, 
79.5%6 of the estimated dollar value of Post Office contracts 
5calculations are based upon data contained in: 
Government of Canada, Public Accounts of Canada 1976, Vol. I, 
pp. 6.34-6.35. 
6Ibid • 
... r I 
c8.'" Lic J.lIIHO ex ... 
. .,., ." ... !'a: 
'rranaporation 
and 
Communications 
113,834,409 
127,502,895 
376,358,241 
. .' 
'rULE I 
Eatimated Dollar Value of Selected ContractuAl ~ctivity 
.By ~ea of Expenditure and Departme"t7 
Profeuional 
and Special 
Services 
95,725,169 
292,758,116 
129,311,146 
58,429,007 
94,620,280 
739,372,395 
Rentab 
23,091,620 
131,024,771 
210,558,910 
Purchased 
'Repair and 
Upkeep 
utilities 
Materials 
and 
Supplies 
176,911,652 ·375,395,548 
50,078,041 54,275,550 
40,188,914 
57,406,348 
294,956,679 615,697,313 
Construction 
and ~cquisi­
tion of Land, 
Bui:ding8 and 
Equipment 
161,267 ,626 
58,S08,877 
203,621,149 
40,635,383 
103,482,960 
43,838,293 
611,660,288 
Construction 
and ~cquisl.­
tion of 
Machinery and 
Equipment 
270,810,899 
59,500,253 
50,113,344 
474,446,123 
7The areas of expenditure in Table 3 are based upon the object of expenditure tables in the Public Accounts 
of Canada. See- Government of Canada, Public Account. of Canada 1976, Vol. 1, pp. 6134-6.35. 
6 
7 
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and 76% of the estimated dollar value of contracts by the 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development are 
concentrated in only two areas of contractual expenditure. 
Although statistical data has proved valuable in 
giving an indication of the importance of the various 
departments to government contracting, it has by no means 
told the whole story. A consideration of those departments 
performing common service and regulatory functions has been 
neglected. 
The principal common service departments are the 
Department of Public Works and the Department of Supply and 
Services. The Department of Public Works is responsible for 
the management and direction of public works for the Govern-
ment of Canada. It oversees the construction and maintenance 
of federal buildings, wharves, piers, roads, bridges, 
harbours and navigable channels. As the federal real property 
administrator, the department is also responsible for 
acquiring leased accommodation for federal use, in addition 
to administering any expropriation activities related to 
such acquisitions. The building construction and acquisition 
expenditures of the department increased by a factor of 
2.65 over the last five years9 , from 91.596 million dollars 
8 11 . Ca cu atJ.ons 
Government of Canada, 
pp. 6.34-6.35. 
are based upon data contained in: 
Public Accounts of Canada 1976, Vol. 1, 
9calculations are based upon information contained in: 
Government of Canada, Department of Public Works, 1975-76 
Annual Report, p. 17. 
8 
in 1971 to 243.070 million dollars in 1976. In 1976, eighty 
percentlO of all Public Works' funding was applied, in almost 
equal proportions, toward the construction and acquisition of 
federal buildings and toward the leasing and maintenance of 
f d 1 d · 11 e era accommo at~on. 
Among the major clients the Department of Public Works 
has served in recent years are the Department of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development, the Department of the Environment, 
the Department of the Solicitor General and the Department of 
Transport. Tables 4 and 5 indicate the contractual expenditures 
made on behalf of these departments by the Department of Public 
Works. 
These tables demonstrate the importance of these 
four departments to the total contracting activity of the 
Department of Public Works over a period of years. The 
surprising element has been that these four departments 
have consistently12 maintained the position of being the 
Department of Public Works' major clients. The program needs 
10 
Ibid., p. 13. 
llIt- is important- to note that expenditures by the 
Department of Public Works fall into two categories. First, 
the department, with its own resources, is responsible for 
supplying federal accommodation. Its second responsibility 
is to act on behalf of other departments, using their resources, 
to meet their program (as distinct from accommodation) needs. 
12 
Department of Public Works'records indicate that 
this consistency has been present since at least 1970. 
Where a department did not exist the functions that it would 
assume in later years formed the basis of this assessment. 
TABLE 4 
Percentage of Contractual Expenditures Applied 
By the Department of Public Works on Behalf 
of Selected Government Departments 
(years refer to fiscal years) 13' 
Department 1974-75 1975-76 
Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development 31% 23% 
Department of the Environment 28% 21% 
Department of the Solicitor General 15% 18% 
All Other Departments 26% 38% 
9 
Total Expenditures $141 million $219 million 
l3The information in this table was derived from 
data contained in: Government of Canada, Department of 
Public Works, 1975-76 Annual Report, p. 15. 
10 
-: 
"TABLE 5 
Dollar Value of Contractural Expenditures Applied 
by the Department of Public Works on Behalf of 
Selected Government Departments Since 1970 
(years refer to fiscal years ended and 
values are stated in millions 
of dollars)14 
Department 1970 '1972 ' 1-974 1976 
Department of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development 13.7 l5.5b 27.8 50.4 Department of the Environment _a 1.4 19.1 46.7 
Department of the Solicitor 
l4.2c 10.2c General 14.6 38.6 
Department of Transport 6.3 4.2 14.9 20.7 
aThe Department of the Environment did not formally exist at 
this time. 
bThis figure is not representative of all the functions under 
the authority of the Department of the Environment. The figure 
does not include a 6.8 million dollar Fisheries expenditure 
nor does it include a 5.9 million dollar Fisheries Research 
Board Expenditure. 
cThese figures do not include expenditures made by the 
Department of Public Works on behalf of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police. These expenditures, totalled 2.6 million 
dollars in the fiscal year ended 1970 and 10.1 million in the 
fiscal year ended 1972. Since 1965 the Solicitor General of 
Canada has been the minister designated to administer the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police. However, the RCMP is 
designated to be a department within the scope and meaning 
of the Financial Administration Act. 
l~The data in this table represents a statement of 
account with respect of the undertakings of the Department of 
Public Works on behalf of selected federal government depart-
ments and agencies. For further information refer to: 
Government of Canada, Department of Public Works, 1975-76 
Annual Report, pp. 25-26; Government of Canada, Department of 
Public Works, 1973-4 Annual Report, pp. 53-54, Government of 
Canada, Department of Public WOrks, 1972 Annua-l RetOrt, pp. 
32-33; Government of Canada, Department of Public orks, 
1970 Annual Report, pp. 36-31. Also see - Government of 
Canada, Interdepartmental Committee on the Organization of the 
Government of Canada, Organization of the Gove-rnmentof 
Canada 1976, Section 81S! on €fie Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 
11 
.7 
of the other departments have not had a substantial impact 
in changing this situation •. 
The other major common service department, the 
Department of Supply and Services, is responsible for the 
provision of common services in the areas of procurement, 
accounting, payment and audit, distribution, warehousing 
and printing. It also provides professional audit, 
advisory management and computer services to government 
departments through the Audit Services Bureau, the Bureau 
of Management Consulting and the Advisory Bureau for 
Computing. The Audit Services Bureau provides audits of 
government contracts on request, where contract costs must 
be determined or where con:t'ractors' cost projections and 
budgets must be evaluated. The Bureau of Management 
Consulting offers a broad range of consulting services to 
government departments and agencies on a fee-for-service 
basis. 
The Department of Supply and Services was created 
in 1969 as the result of a consolidation of government 
purchasing activities. In addition to its service and 
advisory functions it acts as a central procurement agency 
purchasing everything from pens and pencils right through 
to clothes, aircraft and prefabricated buildings. In the 
fiscal year ended March 31, 1976 the Supply Administration 
of the Department of Supply and Services contracted, on 
behalf of government departments and agencies, for the 
15 purchase of 1.848 billion dollars worth of goods and 
services. The department plays a very central role in 
co-ordinating and administering over 44 percent16 of all 
federal government contracting. It should be noted that 
the importance of this department to the contractual 
12 
activity of government stands in sharp contrast to the data 
pre,sented earlier in this chapter, wherein contractual 
expenditures were accredited directly to customer departments. 
Indeed, it is the case that most of the goods procurement 
expenditures of the Department of National Defence go through 
the Department of Supply and Services. 
Also of great importance to the contractual 
activities of the federal government is the crown agency 
corporation Defence Construction (1951) Ltd. 17 The company's 
prime responsibility centers around the construction of 
defence projects. In this capacity the company supervises 
construction field work, administers new construction 
projects and administers the repair, maintenance or renovation 
of existing capital plants for the Department of National 
Defence. It is also responsible for the calling and review 
15 Government of Canada, Department of Supply and 
Services I Biennial Review I 1976, p. 11. 
16 Calculations based on data referred to in footnotes 
14 and 19 for the fiscal year 1976. 
17 
Any substantive consideration of the contractual 
activities of Crown corporations falls outside of the scope 
of this study. 
13 
of all tenders and subsequent contract awards, in addition to 
arranging consulting contracts (engineering and architectural) 
for the department. 
One of the most important regulatory bodies in 
government contract administration is the Treasury Board. 
Its role is to prescribe regulations, either general or 
specific, where it is empowered to do so by statute. It 
may give direction to government contractual activity by 
either discretionary or mandatory guidelines. Government 
Contract Regulations, issued as Orders-in-Council upon 
Treasury Board recommendation, govern such factors as the 
quantity and quality of goods and services required by or 
provided to the government. In addition, these regulations 
govern the methods of goods and service acquisition, 
including the choice of suppliers. Specific policies and 
guidelines are contained in a consolidated statement of 
Treasury Board contract policy, entitled Policy. and Guidelines 
on Contracting in the Government of Canada, issued in June, 
1975. The regulations contained in this document are 
supplementary to any statutory interpretation. 
The next stage in this introduction to government 
contracting will be a consideration of the various types of 
contract with which the government is involved and the 
identification of those upon which this study will focus. 
There are essentially four major types of contracts with which 
the federal government deals. These are construction, goods, 
conSUlting service and non-consulting service contracts. 
14 
This study, in order to limit its scope and avoid unnecessary 
complexity, will concentrate primarily on construction and 
goods contracts to the exclusion of any detailed consideration 
of service contracts. Table 6 gives an indication of the 
importance of goods and construction contracts in various 
departments. Table 6 yields some interesting data. It would 
seem that the contractual activity of certain departments is 
concentrated in the area of goods procurement. This is 
particularly the case with regards to the Post Office and 
the Department of National Defence. Similarly, a great deal 
of construction contracting takes place within the Department 
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The table also 
reveals that two departments have a concentration of 
contractual activity in the area of service contracts. These 
two departments, both minor actors in the area of goods and 
construction procurement, are the Department of Manpower and 
Immigration and the Department of the Secretary of State. 
The next step in the development of this chapter is 
to examine briefly the present trends in Canadian government 
procurement. To this end, the growth, economic significance 
and complexity of government procurement will be examined. 
Government contracting has been a major component 
of government expenditure since World War II. Table 7 
illustrates the growth of the government procurement function 
in Canada over the last decade both in terms of the total 
amount spent and as a percentage of total government 
expenditure. 
TABLE 6 
Rank Order 'of Departments Based Upon the Estimated Dollar Valyg of 
Goods and Construction Contracts (in millions of dollars) 
Indian 
Affairs 
Department National Public Post & Northern Solicitor Manpower & Secretary 
Defence Works . Transport Office Development General Environment Immigration of State 
,Rank Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 14 15 
. Estimated 
Dollar Value 1,148.1 533.7 . 358.3 234.6· 337.4 194.8 189.8 325.0 ' 90.7 
of all 
Contractsa 
Estimated 
Dollar Value 
of Goods and 841.9 425.2 251.3 221.1 225.3 154.9 140.8 ·27.7 28.0 
Construction 
Contracts 
Estimated 
Dollar Value 783.1 221.6 147.9 221.1 64.1 114.3 97.0 27.7 24.' of Goods 
Contractsb 
Estimated 
Dollar Value of 58.8 203.6 103.4 construction - 161.2 40.0 43.8 3.1 
ContractsC 
a . 
As per Table 1. 
bThese values were calculated on the basis of exp~nditure columns 2, S, 7 and 9 in the standard object of expenditure 
tables in the Public Accounts of Canada 1976. These estimates are judqed to be high isofar as the categories mentione4 
although appearing to be predom1nently composed of goods expenditures, do contain service and construction 
contract expenditures. 
Crhese are low estimates insofar as other categories 'include construction-related expenditures. 
~SC~lculations are based upon data contained in: Government of Canada, Public Accounts of Canada 1976, 
Vol. 1, pp. 6.34-6.35. 
.~ 
-I-' 
U1 
.' 
TABLE 7 
Government Procurement Expenditures Over the 
Last Decade (in millions of do11ars)19 
16 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total 
Procurement 
Total 
Government 
. Expenditure 
Total Procurement 
as a Percentage of 
Total Government 
1965-66 
1970-71 
1975-76 
1,450.49 
1,955.50 
4,111.52 
7,734.80 
13,182.14 
33,181.25 
.. Expenditure· . 
18.75% 
14.83% 
12.39% 
The increase in contractual expenditure has risen since 1966 
by a factor of 2.83. 20 This compares to an increase in total 
government expenditure over the same period by a factor of 
4.29. 21 This indicates that government procurement expenditures 
have declined as a percentage of the total budget by 1/3 over 
the last ten years. 
When procurement expenditures are examined as a 
percentage of total expenditure there tends to be an 
inclination to underestimate the economic significance of 
government contracting. However, procurement expenditures 
are thought to generate more than their dollar amount through 
what is known as the "multiplier" effect (secondary and 
20This figure represents a calculation based on 
data contained in Table 7. 
21Ibid • 
related spending). In the united States, procurement 
expenditures are thought to generate three times their 
dollar amount. 22 The Canadian figure is probably less 
17 
insofar as a great deal of government procurement expenditure 
is directed at foreign owned or controlled companies, which 
may not choose to reinvest their earnings in Canada. The 
impact of government procurement on the nation's economic 
and social well-being does not end here. The awarding of a 
major contract can stimulate regional and local growth. 
On the other side of the coin a lack of government contracts 
might undermine long-established enterprises and even cause 
severe economic hardship in some communities. 
Federal government procurement also plays a catalytic 
role in the economy. Many industrial and commercial enter-
prises have been spawned by the spinoff effect of technological 
23 breakthroughs prompted by government needs. Government 
procurement also acts in small or large measure as a vehicle 
with which to achieve a variety of national, social and 
economic objectives. For instance, Canadian content can be 
promoted in the areas of labour, materials and profit; wages 
and employment conditions can be improved; equal employment 
standards can be introduced and regional employment 
opportunities can be created. Although the government may 
22Government of the United States, Report of the 
Commission on Government Procurement, Vol. 1, p. 3. 
23 Examples of the spinoff effect may be seen in the 
work referred to in Footnote 22. 
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not always actively promote such national objectives through 
government procurement, the ability to do so remains. 
As with any important and growing function of 
. government, the procurement function has become increasingly 
complex. Despite efforts to centralize procurement under 
the control of common service departments, the procurement 
function is still widely spread among the various government 
departments. For instance, government departments are still 
responsible for contracting for their own service needs, and 
some departments such as the Department of Transport and 
the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
are deeply involved in construction contracting despite the 
existence of the Department of Public Works, a common service 
department geared to this purpose. Similarly, the respon-
sibility for the procurement of goods is supposed to lie 
with the Department of Supply and Services, but it too is 
spread throughout t~e government - to a lesser but still 
significant degree. 
The complexity of government contracting carries 
over from the institutional arrangements to the procurement 
process itself. Consider the conceptual diagram of the 
procurement process in the united States presented in 
Figure 1. It applies directly to the Canadian case. 
19 
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FIGURE 124 
Tl:E PROCUREri:E~!T P:lOCESS 
Needs and the authorized funds with which to meet 
these needs constitute the inputs into the process. Then, 
within the parameters of statutes and regulations, the 
process proceeds. The planning process encompasses the full 
range of product planning. This includes such considerations 
as source identification, requirement definition, method of 
acquisition and financial analysis. The planning stage is 
followed by the solicitation and selection stages. The 
24G f h . d f h overnment 0 t e Un~te States, Report 0 t e 
Commission on Government Procurement, Vol. 1, p. 2. 
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number of available suppliers determine whether a competitive 
situation exists and whether the contract will be competitively 
advertised or negotiated. Even in a competitive situation 
negotiations may take place in unusual cases in order to make 
the bidders more completely aware of government requirements 
within the tender. The contract award stage depicted in 
Figure I is followed by the final step in the process, the 
contract administration stage. The latter is essentially 
the monitoring, change and performance assessment stage. 
Table 8, shown below, relates to the procurement of 
goods in Canada and demonstrates further the nature and 
complexity of the procurement process illustrated in Figure I. 
Table 8 gives a good indication of the multiplicity of 
factors and considerations that are involved in the product 
planning, solicitation and contract administration stages 
previously discussed. The complexity of the procurement 
process is even further compounded by distribution and total 
cost management considerations, where applicable. 
21 
TABLE 825 
Elements of the Procurement Process (Goods) 
PRODUCT PLANNING 
Economic and Market Analysis 
Item profile assessment 
Industry sector analysis 
customer analysis 
Source identification 
Source development 
Interprogram cost benefit 
Optimization of PROC costs 
Requirement Definition 
Determine need 
Value engineering 
Procurement planning 
Material identification 
Specifications and 
standards 
Quality assurance 
requirements 
Statement of requirement 
(TCP) (time, cost, 
performance) 
Estimating 
Method of Supply 
Make or buy 
Facility evaluation 
Regional or central 
acquisition 
Regional or central 
distribution 
Lease or purchase 
Consignment 
PROC Financial Analysis 
.. ACQUISIT.ION .. 
Proje'ct Management 
Contracting 
Description of requirement 
Sourcing 
Price and availability 
determination 
Bid solicitation 
Contract negotiation 
Contractor selection and 
award 
contract Administration 
Monitor time, cost, performance 
Expediting and fo11owup 
Design change or deviation 
Contract amendment 
Quality assurance 
Delivery, acceptance and 
payment 
Termination and settlement 
Cost Audit 
Plant and personnel security 
25confidentia1 and unpublished material, Government of 
Canada, Department of Supply and Services, 1975. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE OBJECTIVES OF CONTROL 
The need for effective control over federal government 
contracting becomes increasingly necessary as the procurement 
function of government grows and as the responsibility for 
government procurement is vested in more and more hands. 
However, before proceeding to examine the objectives behind 
control over government contracting, it is important to first 
explain the meaning of the word control and how it is used 
in this thesis. 
The word control is taken to mean the exercise of 
authority for the purpose of ensuring and verifying that 
government conduct in the procurement of construction, goods 
and services does not exceed its statutory authority or fail 
to meet its objectives. Control entails authority, which 
in turn implies the power to command acceptance, belief and 
obedience based on the strength, virtue and power of one's 
position. Also implicit in the notion of control is the 
idea of influence. Influence implies the power of persons 
to consciously or unconsciously affect, direct, restrain or 
govern the actions and decisions of others. 26 Control is 
26 f h d f' ., . h' h Some 0 tee ~n~t~ons ~n t ~s paragrap were 
derived in part from: Webster's New World Dictionary, College 
Edition (Toronto: Nelson, Foster and Scott, 1972). 
further understood to have three important functions in 
government contracting: 
- control sets standards or 
performance indicators to 
measure achievement 
- control checks results or 
measures achievement 
- control takes corrective 
or remedial action as 
required. 27 
Thus, the word control, as it is used in this thesis, is 
applicable in both political and administrative contexts, 
23 
includes the concepts of influence and authority, has three 
important monitoring functions, and is understood in terms 
of how well it meets its objectives. 
The objectives of control are many and varied~ The 
primary objective would appear to be the need for government 
to be accountable for the public trust. To this end, it is 
necessary that the government be able to justify its actions 
as being in the public interest. Other important objectives 
of control over government contracting include considerations 
of equity, economy, efficiency and effectiveness. According 
to the Department of Supply and Services, there are two 
overriding principles to be adhered to with respect to 
contracting: 
27 
1) Equity of opportunity to compete 
for government contracts must be 
afforded to all qualified 
suppliers. 
A. M. Willms, "Control in Government Administration," 
in A. M. Willms and W. D. K. Kernaghan, Public Administration 
in Canada: Selected Readings (Toronto: Methuen, 1968), 
p. 226. 
2) The Administration must obtain 
fair va~He for the taxpayer's 
dollar. 
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The notion of obtaining fair value entails three concepts -
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The use of the word 
economy refers to the careful planned management of wealth 
and resources undertaken with a minimum of waste. Efficiency 
is a performance measure - it is the ratio of accomplishment 
over cost. When maximum production is achieved with given 
resources the best efficiency can be said to result. 
Effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which an activity 
achieves an organization's objectives. Efficiency and effec-
tiveness are closely related in that the more efficient an 
operation is the more effective it is likely to be. But 
insofar as one is dealing with the government, the most 
acceptable standard of achievement need not be the most 
efficient. The political and public acceptability of a 
service or production is often just as important to the 
public servant as maximizing efficiency. 
The objective of equity is also an important element 
in government contracting. The go¥ernment generally uses 
competitive bidding as a mechanism for ensuring equity. 
The exceptions to this rule are when: 
1) prices or sources of supply are 
determined by federal, provincial 
and other regulatory bodies; or 
2) government objectives, operational 
requirements or administrative 
28confidentia1 and unpublished material, Government 
of Canada, Department of Supply and Services, 1976. 
.7 
costs preclude competitive 
bidding; or 
3) true competition conditions 
do not exist. 29 
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In order to ensure that an adequate level of competitive 
response is achieved in contracting the Department of Supply 
and Services has created source lists and has engaged in the 
advertising of tenders. 
Equity is an essential goal in a democratic system. 
It can be promoted by ensuring fairness and by ensuring high 
ethical standards through the avoidance of bribery, corruption, 
patronage, conflicts of interest and the like. It is 
fundamentally objectionable when a government plays favourites 
and runs counter to notions of fair play and assumptions of 
free competition. High on the list of government priorities 
is the need to maintain public confidence. And the public, 
although perhaps not able to understand many decisions taken 
by government, can usually recognize underhanded dealings. 
For this reason governments are always keenly conscious of 
the need to prevent what is known in the vernacular of the 
civil servant as a "horror". 
The onus of responsibility to disclose to his 
superior potential conflicts of interest rests with the 
individual civil servant. An Order-in-Council dated 
December 18, 1973 concerning Public Servants Conflict of 
Interest Guidelines states further in this regard: 
Upon appointment to office, public 
servants are expected to arrange 
29Ibid • 
-
their private affairs in a manner 
that will prevent conflicts of 
interest from arising. 30 
The government has even undertaken to identify 
potential areas of conflict in the area of government 
contracting. These include: 
1) awarding of contracts 
2) purchasing of goods 
3) inspection of goods 
4) shareholding and/or silent 
partnerships in supplier 
companies, and/or family 
owned businesses 
5) acceptance of gifts. 3l 
26 
In reference to the acceptance of gifts, the public servant 
is allowed to accept benefits provided that they are of a 
casual nature such as hospitality or a small gift item 
which is a normal expression of business courtesy. This 
would include a calendar or something similar which is a 
publicity item of a purely nominal value. 
The Criminal Code of Canada has provisions relating 
to some of the more serious offences concerning the contractual 
affairs of government such as breach of trust, bribery, 
corruption and patronage. Section 296 of the Code makes 
it an indictable offence for any public trustee to 
intentionally defraud or violate his trust or put it to 
a use that is not authorized by the trust. An example of 
3DC f·d . 1 d ubl· h d t . 1 G on 1 ent1a an unp 1S e ma er1a, overnment 
of Canada, Treasury Board, updated to 1976. 
31 
Ibid. The areas listed are part of a larger 
listing of potential areas of conflict. 
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the latter instance is a public servant buying shares in 
a company which he knows is about to be awarded a large 
contract. Breach of trust provisions within the Code are 
limited to those people who fall within the definition of 
an official holding office and administering a trust. The 
employees of a company under contract to the federal 
government are not subject to these provisions. 32 
The provisions concerning bribery and corruption 
of government officers are found in Sections 108, 109, 113 
and 114 of the Criminal Code. Section 108 governs the 
acceptance by or offer to a Member of Parliament of a 
valuable consideration including employment in exchange for 
an omission or act done to procure such consideration for 
himself or another person. "The corrupt act does not have 
to be in connection with his legislative duties, it may be 
in connection with his participation in an administrative 
33 
act of government." Proceedings based upon this section 
of the Code may be instituted only upon the written consent 
of the Attorney General of Canada. Section 109 is similar 
to Section 108 except insofar as its applicability is 
32 
J. Martin and I. Cartwright, Martin's Annual 
Criminal Code 1974 (Agincourt, Ontario: Canada Law Book 
Ltd., 1974), p. 64. See - R vs. Pruss, [1966] c.c.c. 
315, 47 C.R. 358 (Y. T. Mag. Ct.). 
33 
Ibid., p. 61. See - R vs. Bruneau, [1964] 
c.c.c. 97,~C.R. 93 (aNT. C.A.). 
limited to public officers and the written consent of the 
Attorney General of Canada is not necessary to institute 
proceedings .. 
Sections 113 and 114 deal with the selling and 
28 
purchasing of offices and the influencing and negotiation 
of offices, respectively. Section 113 refers to the direct 
sale or purchase of an appointment, resignation or consent, 
or the promise thereof, for renumeration, contractually 
related or otherwise. Section n4 refers to the granting 
of assistance, co-operation or influence in the form of 
solicitation, recommendation or negotiation for any kind of 
consideration, reward, advantage or benefit. The trans-
gression of any of these laws governing bribery and 
corruption constitutes an indictable offence under the 
Criminal Code. 
Section 110 of the Code deals directly with matters 
of patronage. Under the provisions of this section it is 
an offence if one: 
(a) directly or indirectly 
(i) gives, offers or agrees to 
give or offer to an official 
or to any member of his 
family, or to anyone for the 
benefit of an official, or 
(ii) being an official, demands, 
accepts or offers or agrees 
to accept from any person for 
himself or another person, a 
loan reward, advantage or 
benefit of any kind as consid-
eration for cooperation, 
assistance, exercise of 
influence or an act or omission 
in connection with 
(iii) the transaction of business 
relating to the government, for 
(iv) a claim against Her Majesty or 
any benefit that Her Majesty is 
authorized or is entitled to 
bestow, whether or not, in fact, 
the official is able to cooperate, 
render assistance, exercise 
influence or do or omit to do 
what is proposed, as the case 
may be.3~ 
29 
Also included in this section are provisions relating to the 
offer of a consideration to a Minister of the Crown or an 
official in order to secure co-operation, assistance, 
influence or an omission in connection with the granting of 
a government contract. It is also an indictable offence 
under Section 110 for anyone to subscribe a valuable 
consideration upon a candidate or class of candidates for 
the Parliament of Canada for the purpose of obtaining or 
retaining a contract with the government. 
The provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada are 
vital to the protection of equity in the contractual affairs 
of government. They are often supplemented by government 
or departmental regulations. Although the provisions of 
the Code tend to be general, their applicability with 
respect to the promotion of equity in government contracting 
is readily discernible. 
Also entailed in equity is the notion of fairness. 
The government, when contracting, does not seek the best 
deal it can at the expense of being fair. Indeed, the 
34 . Ib1d., p. 62. 
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government will even go so far as to consider allowing extra 
payment on an awarded contract in certain circumstances: 
1) When the Crown by action or 
omission causes extra or abnormal 
costs to the contractor. 
2) When special engineering and 
technical difficulties that could 
not have been foreseen occur. 
3) When major significant damages 
are caused by an Act of God and 
the contractor is in no way at 
fault. 35 
The other prime objective of control over government 
contracting is the desire to ensure economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness in the procurement function of government. 
To this end, the objectives of the government procurement 
function include: 
1) cost reduction or profit-making 
2) control of financial commitments 
3) control of negotiations 
4) provision of information and 
assistance in the specialized 
purchasing field, to management 
and other groups.36 
The government has tackled the problem of trying 
to ensure that best value has been received for each 
dollar spent by recommending, where appropriate, the use 
of an elaborate financial analysis tool for total cost 
management referred to as the Product Resource Operating 
35confidential and unpublished material, Government 
of Canada, Department of Supply and Services, 1976. 
36 1 . . Ph' db k 2 d d' . G. W. A J1an, urc aS1ng Han 00, n e 1t10n 
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 1-5. 
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and Contingent Cost method or more simply PROC. The 
Treasury Board sees PROC as an effective mechanism with 
which to "achieve the optimal combination of quality, time 
d 1 l 'f 1 t f th "t' "37 an tota 1 e-cyc e cos s 0 e acqu1s1 1on. The 
Treasury Board has made reference to and explained PROC 
in the following form: 
When the nature of the acquisition 
is such that an analysis to 
determine best value is appropriate, 
this analysis should determine the 
optimum total cost of each available 
option by considering each of the 
following elements: 
Ca) Product Cost, that is the direct 
cost of goods and services 
delivered or the cost of 
construction and/or leasing of 
property. Usually this is the 
equivalent of the basic 
contractual price. However, 
it should also include the cost 
of transportation and 
installation at the point of use1 
(b) Resource Cost, that is, the 
indirect cost within the 
requisitioning department and/or 
common service agency of supplying 
or acquiring goods and services 
and carrying out construction and/or 
leasing of property. This can 
include such resources as design, 
preparation of specifications, 
contract administration and quality 
assurance; 
(c) Operating Cost, that is, the cost of 
operating, maintaining and repairing 
the acquisition throughout its 
useful life, plus consideration of 
residual value at the time of 
retirement. The useful life should 
be related to the need for the 
37Government of Canada, Treasury Board, Policy and 
Guidelines on Contracting in the Government of Canada, 
June 1975, p. 5. 
acquisition and may be different 
than its expected technological 
or physical life; 
(d) Contingent Cost, that is the 
cost to the user of not having 
the right goods, services or 
facility provided at the right 
place at the right time. This 
can include costs incurred while 
waiting for delivery as well as 
an assessment of the likelihood 
of failure and the costs, 
additional to the cost of repair, 
that would be associated there-
with. The minimization of this 
cost requires sound pre-planning, 
contract administration and, 
where appropriate, project 
management, so that situations 
of urgency or unnecessary delay 
are avoided where possible. 
The consideration of contingent 
costs may also affect the levels 
of quality and performance as 
outlined in the definition of 
requirements. 38 
There is one additional objective of control over 
government contracting. This objective is to ensure, 
whenever appropriate, that government contracting relates 
to national policies and objectives. This involves such 
32 
activities as contributing to regional development and the 
existence of a competitive market. It also involves 
promoting government procurement policies based upon such 
considerations as the amount of Canadian content present 
in a product. It should be noted, however, that the 
promotion of such socio-economic goods may not always be 
consistent with the other objectives of control. 
38 
~., p. 6. 
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The objectives behind control over government 
contracting are nicely summed up in the following Treasury 
Board policy statement: 
The purpose of Government procurement 
is to acquire goods and services and 
carry out construction and leasing, 
through the contracting arrangements 
that best satisfy specific program 
requirements of the Government of 
Canada. Government contracting shall 
be conducted in a manner which will: 
(a) achieve the optimal combination 
of quality, time and total life-
cycle costs of the acquisition; 
(b) reflect fairness in the spending 
of public funds; and 
(c) when appropriate, relate to 
national policies and objectives. 39 
39~., p. 5. 
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CHAPTER III 
IMPEDIMENTS TO CONTROL 
This chapter examines certain major problems in 
government contracting which act to hinder the attainment 
of the objectives discussed in Chapter II and thereby 
reduce effective control over government contracting by the 
government departments and agencies concerned. It is the 
purpose of this chapter to provide a foundation for a 
consideration in subsequent chapters of the instruments 
of control and their effectiveness. 
Government contracting policies and procedures 
have been continually refined over the years. Even the 
contractual documents have, as in the case of the 
standardized construction contract, been subject to 
constant revision and improvement. Yet despite all the 
effort that has been made to improve the government 
procurement system, problems still exist. This chapter 
will examine three such problems which impede the exercise 
of control over government contracting. These problems, 
expressed in terms of the objectives of control, are: 
1) cost control, 
2) the maintenance of fairness and justice in the 
procurement process, 
3) the introduction of socio-economic goals which are 
35 
incompatible with traditional procurement standards. 
Cost Control 
The most common problem associated with cost control 
appears to be the problem of defining need. Basically, this 
problem is also one of common service agency and customer 
department.~ relations. For instance, in the area of goods 
procurement, a customer department may order a certain number 
of model XY calculators. The Department of Supply and 
Services is then faced with the problem of reducing cost. 
Does the customer department really need model XY or would 
model Z do? Or can the department use model Q which is 
available at a lower price because several other departments 
have ordered it? The problem is thus one of the department 
giving specific as opposed to performance specifications. 
Customer departments often frustrate the objective 
of obtaining best value by submitting single source requests. 
This usually occurs in response to companies efforts to 
40 promote their brand name within a department. Another 
f h h ' 1 ' . t' 41 o t e reasons w y so many s1ng e source requ1s1 10ns are 
40The result of this salesmanship is often wasteful 
purchasing. This is the case with the procurement of 
calculators. Programmable calculators are sitting on the 
desks of people who don't know how to use them. Sources 
confidential: Departments of National Defence, Supply and 
Services and Public Works, Government of Canada. 
4lAn estimated 35% of all supply contracts and 60% 
of non-competitive supply contracts are thought to be single 
source requests by the department concerned. This estimate 
was said to be conservative. Source confidential, 
Department of Supply and Services, Government of Canada, 
Ottawa, August, 1976. 
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sent to the Department of Supply and Services seems to be 
the need of departmental purchasing officers to exercise 
some power. The only area of decision left to them is that 
of defining needs. 42 And they certainly don't want their 
power eroded any further. 43 The tendency toward infighting 
and empire building within the civil service is too strong 
to allow that to happen. 
In an effort to keep customer departments happy the 
Department of Supply and Services will occasionally send 
d h d f h k d ·· 44 ten ers to t e epartments or t em to ma e a eC1S10n on. 
In so doing the equity of the procurement process falls 
into jeopardy. For example, imagine the Department of 
Supply and Services contracting on behalf of the Department 
of National Defence for ammunition crates with a strength 
of 100 p.s.i. The low bid that is received is for crates 
with a strength of 99 p.s.i. So if one sends the tenders 
back to the customer department for a decision one is really 
being unfair to the other suppliers insofar as the original 
specifications stated the requirement to be for a 100 p.s.i. 
crate. This sort of problem also occurs with delivery dates. 
42The Department of Supply and Services sometimes 
goes back to customer departments in order to see if a 
change in quality or type would be acceptable. 
43 The Department of Supply and Services can fight 
customer departments up to a point but beyond that they 
would create too much bad will. 
44It should be noted that such action is contrary 
to the department's policy and is considered to be a rare 
occurrence. 
37 
A customer department's delivery date may be unrealistic. 
Given another week a supplier might be able to give a much 
better price as he would perhaps not be rushed so much. Or 
what happens if the low bid includes a delivery date that 
is two weeks later than the one requested? The objectives 
of best value and equity are thus often at odds with each 
other. 
Another important question related to cost control 
is when direct use of the private distribution system should 
be made. The question is whether the government should rely 
on its own resources or rely on the private sector for the 
provision of goods and construction. It is often the case in 
construction that the private sector is faster and less 
expensive than Crown construction. And in the area of goods 
procurement it is often the case that the private sector 
can, where economies of scale do not apply, supply government 
departments directly and economically with stationary and 
similar needs, thus avoiding the high overhead costs within 
the Department of Supply and Services. It would often appear 
more cost effective to purchase such materials from the 
parallel private distribution system, where one need only 
walk down the street to pick up what one needs. 
And this leads one to the question of common service 
department cost recovery_ Consider the Department of Supply 
and Services. The average administrative cost at headquarters 
is $400 for a commercial contract and $1200 for a scientific 
contract. This compares with an average administrative cost 
38 
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f $36 t · th . 45 o per con ract ~n e reg~ons. There are several 
reasons why the Department of Supply and Services has such 
a high overhead and why cost recovery is such a problem. 
First of all there are price and availability requests where 
individuals want to decide if their department can afford 
a certain item. 46 There are also the long and intensive 
technical negotiations for something like the Long Range 
Patrol Aircraft (Orion renamed Aurora) for which a contract 
might never result. And finally, there is the problem of 
contract cycle fluctuations, where certain personnel may be 
left with relatively little work pending the arrival of 
another large and involved contract in their area of 
expertise. All of these factors contribute to the high 
overhead in the Department of Supply and Services and to 
47 
their inability to recover administrative costs from 
customer departments. 
Another major problem associated with cost control 
is financial mismanagement of government contractual 
resources. A common variant of this problem is duplication 
45 Based on data in 1976 study, source confidential. 
46The Department of Supply and Services can charge 
an administrative fee for its contracting services only when 
a contract has been issued. 
47Administrative charges vary from no charge to a 
customer department for a contract resulting from a national 
master standing offer to a 6% charge on the value of a 
contract for a scientific purchase valued under $10,000. 
Source confidential. 
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of effort, the net result of which is increased expenditures 
or manpower requirements. Such duplication is often found 
to be the product of communication problems within the 
bureaucracy. A case in point is the effort expended on a 
contract by a building project manager who was unaware that 
the government had a standard construction contract. 48 
Contract changes and amendments may also result in duplication 
of effort. For example, a contract may be awarded for the 
construction of a new prison. During construction a new 
deputy minister or Minister may assume office in the 
department concerned. He or she may have new ideas on the 
philosophy of housing prisoners. As a result, contract 
changes may be instituted necessitating a costly re-
evaluation of building requirements. Duplication of effort 
can also result in those areas in which functional overlap 
exists. 
Financial mismanagement may also be seen in terms 
of a lack of planning and co-ordination with respect to 
government procurement activities. The classic horror story 
illustrative of such a case is the construction of the new 
Post Office Terminal in Toronto. 49 The automated equipment 
design was changed without co-ordinating these changes with 
the structure of the building. As a result, conveyor belts 
48AS related by S. Ings, Contract Policy and 
Administration, Department of Public Works, Government of 
Canada, Ottawa, July, 1976. 
49source confidential, August, 1916. 
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ran into brick walls and lighting fixtures. It was an 
unqualified disaster. Another example illustrative of 
inadequate communication and co-oridnation is the case of 
a construction delay involving a series of buildings being 
erected by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
50 Development. The delay was caused because the nails had 
not arrived at the construction site. The Department of 
Supply and Services had contracted for all the building 
materials, but the nail supplier hadn't sent his order,as 
he was awaiting more orders for that area to save shipping 
costs. Both these examples demonstrate the need for better 
communication and co-ordination in government procurement. 
Fairness and Justice 
Another impediment to control over federal government 
contracting is the problem of maintaining fairness and justice 
in the procurement process. This entails not only preventing 
graft, but maintaining equitable administrative practices 
and procedures. 
In the interests of a just procurement system, it 
, t t fl' t f' t t f ' , 51 1S necessary 0 preven con 1C s 0 1n eres rom ar1s1ng 
and to deter those in authority from misusing their office, 
being subject to bribery and corruption and engaging in 
50As related by Mr. W. Allen, Contracts and 
Construction Management Division, Department of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development, Government of Canada, 
Ottawa, August, 1976. 
51The Skyshops affair is an example of a case which 
involves conflict of interest, misuse of office and bribery. 
41 
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52 patronage. The Criminal Code of Canada has provisions 
making it a criminal offence to engage in such activities. 
However, the law alone cannot act as an effective deterrent. 
It must be supplemented by discovery and enforcement in order 
that it might pose a credible threat to a potential offender. 
And if the Skyshops and Harbourgate affairs are any indication, 
a great deal of illicit contractual activity may have gone 
unnoticed over the years. 
In addition to preventing graft, it is important 
that the procurement system maintain equitable administrative 
practices and procedures. It is often the case that certain 
government departments have no set procedures for dealing 
with contractual problems involving questions of fairness. 
For instance, a $2,000 contract might be sent to 44 firms to 
bid on and only 4 firms may reply. Due to a delay the tenders 
lapse. Should the offer be reissued to all 44 firms? In 
the case of a $2,000 contract does going to so many firms 
in the first place make any sense? And secondly, should 
procedures be so rigidly defined as not to allow for common 
sense? A procedure is subject to a certain reasoning and 
if the civil servant understands that reasoning he can 
better exercise discretion in those circumstances where 
its application is warranted. 
52It should be noted that patronage is often 
difficult to distinguish from legitimate responses to 
genuine needs. This is particularly true with respect to 
public works which are aimed at a particular constituency, 
region or segment of the population. 
Procurement procedures are also subject to 
communication problems which prevent the system from 
functioning properly. For example, in construction 
contracting, addendums 53 are often issued during the 
tendering stage for contractors to bid on. It is not 
uncommon for one or more contractors to fail to bid on 
1 . . . 54 the addendum or c a1m not to have rece1ved 1t. The 
equity of the procurement system is thus put in jeopardy. 
Numerous instances exist in which the fairness of 
42 
procurement procedures might be questioned. To illustrate 
this, imagine a highway construction project. Contractor X 
is awarded a contract to build a section of highway from 
Point A to Point B. During construction the government 
decides to extend the highway to Point C. The government, 
assuming contractor X would incur the lowest construction 
costs, as he has everything set up on the job site already, 
negotiates a price with him for construction of the highway 
extension. By not calling tenders in this case, the govern-
ment has frustrated the attainment of the objective of equity 
within the procurement system. 
The translation of policy into practice can also 
present a formidable obstacle. For example, there is a 
tendency to want to remain with old and trusted suppliers 
53 Addendums are additions or supplements to the 
original contract. 
54 As related by L. L. Dixon, Contract Policy and 
Review, Transport Canada, Government of Canada, Ottawa, 
August, 1976. 
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and contractors rather than accept new ones, even when 
. b l' d 55 h ' sav1ngs can e rea 1ze. Suc a pract1ce runs counter to 
the principles behind control - equity and best value - and 
thereby hinders effective control over government contracting. 
Socio-Economic Goals 
The final problem to be discussed in this chapter is 
that of the introduction of socio-economic goals which are 
incompatible with traditional procurement standards. Such 
goals are said to be incompatible when they are inconsistent 
with the primary objectives of equity and best value. 
Although socio-economic goals must at times receive priority, 
they are often best promoted by other means and should not 
needlessly undermine other important objectives of control. 
In this context, this chapter will now undertake ~o examine 
instances of conflict between particular national socio-
economic goals and the objectives of equity and best value. 
The national goals to be examined in the context of government 
contracting are the promotion of Canadian content in product 
procurement and the promotion of regional equality in 
economic development. 
One of the foremost national goals in Canada is the 
promotion of Canadian content in product or goods procurement. 
The Department of Supply and Services has established four 
priority groups with respect to the promotion of Canadian 
55sources confidential, Department of Supply and 
Services and Department of Public Works, Government of 
Canada, Ottawa, July and August, 1976. 
content in the selection of suppliers. The four groups 
in order of priority are: 
1) Canadian manufacturers, 
2) Canadian based agents of foreign or Canadian companies 
(with fo11owup after sales aervice). 
3) Canadian based companies acting as agents for Canadian 
or foreign manufacturers, 
4) foreign manufacturers. 56 
44 
One will note that foreign producers are not invited to bid 
on a contract when there are an adequate number of Canadian 
57 based sources of supply. In creating these priority groups 
the Canadian government has seen fit to sacrifice equity in 
the procurement process and forego the opportunity of 
58 
obtaining better value for the taxpayer's dollar. 
The four priority groups help guide Department of 
Supply and Service$ contract administrators in the selection 
of suppliers. However, in the evaluation of tenders another 
Canadian content rule comes into play. It is commonly 
referred to as the 10 percent difference in foreign content 
56 
Confidential and unpublished material, Government 
of Canada, Department of Supply and Services, 1976. 
57 
The Canada-United States Defence Production Sharing 
Programme and the resulting interdependency in the area of 
defence production is an important exception to this rule. 
58 
Lowest cost is not the sole criteria for deter-
m1n1ng best value. Other considerations such as increased 
tax revenues and the effects on welfare and unemployment 
expenditures should be, but are often not considered. 
rule. This rule works in the following way:59 
FIGURE 2 
10 Percent Difference in Foreign 
content Rule Illustrated 
Bidder A 
Bids $1.03 per unit 
Canadian content $.50 
Foreign content $.50 
Bidder B 
$1.00 per unit 
$ .10 
$ .90 
Difference in Foreign Content $.90 - $.50 = $.40 
45 
10 Percent Difference in Foreign Content 10% x $.40 = $.04 
= 4 cents 
Therefore, Bidder A wins as his bid can be as high as $1.04 
($1.00 plus $.04 = $1.04). 
One must remember that other factors such as quality and 
maintenance considerations come into play. Consequently, 
the 10 percent difference rule is rarely effective in 
changing an award. 60 
One encounters a number of problems in applying 
this rule. One such problem is that the expense of an 
audit tends to prevent effective verification of a firm's 
59source confidential, Department of Supply and 
Services, Government of Canada, March, 1977. 
60Ibid • 
.............. 
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estimate of domestic and foreign content in its product. 
Consider the following example of how the equity of the 
procurement process was undermined. A certain firm had 
been given a contract to supply fruit juice to a government 
department. Although the pulp came from a far Eastern 
country, the product was of high Canadian content insofar 
as Canadian water was used in its manufacture. 6l 
The Department of Supply and Services tends to depend 
"on complaints from competitors and the ethical standards of 
the firm to ensure accurate representations of domestic 
content. [To this end,] competitors in a tender are allowed 
to know the name and price quoted by the winning tender •. ,62 
Other major departments in the procurement field, such as 
the Department of Public Works, are also subject to this 
method of verification. 
Not all departments have a formula that they can 
apply to the question of Canadian content. Most departments 
use discretion in awarding a contract on the basis of 
Canadian content. The exercise of discretion indicates 
less control over government contracting but tends to be 
limited to those tenders which are fairly equal in terms 
of such factors as quality and cost. A big drawback with 
respect to exercising discretion on the Canadian content 
61source confidential, Department of Supply and 
Services, Government of Canada, Ottawa, July, 1976. 
62 K. Stegemann and K. Acheson, "Canadian Government 
Purchasing Policy, t. in Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 6 
(1972), No.4, pp. 460-461. 
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question is that one can seldom be sure that the criterion 
of Canadian content is not being used as a justification 
for political patronage. This does not sound so far fetched 
when one considers that in 1969, when the Department of 
Supply and Services took over the Department of Public 
Works' supply lists, they found them to be constructed on 
a partisan political basis. 63 
The final socio-economic goal to be examined is the 
promotion of regional equality in economic development. This 
goal tends to conflict with the objectives of equity and 
best value. The procurement of uniforms is a case in point. 
The Department of Supply and Services supplies cloth, stored 
in its warehouses, to firms for the manufacture of government 
uniform requirements. The department offers the following 
explanation for this procedure: 
63 
the armed forces specify material 
which is different from the 
commercially available cloth. DSS 
then tries to buy quantities of 
cloth large enough to warrant 
minimum mill runs in order to keep 
down cost. They store the cloth 
and supply it to manufacturers of 
shirts whenever the shirts are 
needed. We have been told that 
"small business" considerations 
are a factor in this policy. DSS 
could place larger orders for shirts 
and have the manufacturer arrange 
for economical procurement of cloth 
made to DND specifications. However, 
small needlework manufacturing firms 
complained that DSS was favouring 
large producers. For this reason, 
sources confidential. 
DSS is splitting up the orders of 
shirts into batches which can 
still be made economically and 
provides the cloth for which 
larger quantities are required to 
be ordered to exploit economies 
of scale. 64 
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65 This policy ensures the purchase of Canadian-made cloth, 
but only at the expense of not using low cost imported 
cloth, which may often represent the best value. The 
reliance of certain geographically deprived areas on the 
textile and related industries for employment opportunities 
seems to be the basis of this procurement policy, insofar 
as the existence of regional economic disparities poses a 
threat to national unity, not to mention the future electoral 
success of the majority party. However, it would appear more 
appropriate to employ tariff rather than procurement policies 
as the means by which to afford protection to the textile 
industry. 
Regional considerations can also come into play in 
the negotiation of a contract. A large contractor can be 
directed to disburse some of his subcontracting work to 
regionally depressed areas. There is evidence to suggest 
that such influence was exercised by the Department of 
66 
Defence Production in the early 60s, but the extent to 
64Stegemann and Acheson, "Canadian Government 
Purchasing Policy," p. 463. 
65The Department of Supply and Services tends to 
invite only Canadian tenders when purchasing cloth. 
66Stegemann and Acheson, "Canadian Government 
Purchasing Policy," p. 473. 
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which it exists today is not known. Although the Department 
of Supply and Services maintains that contracts are not 
given out on the basis of regional considerations, "some of 
the directives issued to the department have been clearly 
motivated by the desire to alleviate the problems of 
depressed regions through increasing the sales of declining 
industries located in the regions. p67 The protection afforded 
the textile, clothing, shoe and shipbuilding industries 
illustrates this point. 
National socio-economic goals are based on totally 
different conceptions than those relating to procurement. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that they frequently 
conflict with the objectives of equity and best value. The 
OECD Working Group on Government Purchasing has stated 
in this regard: 
The notion that government purchasing 
can be used as an instrument to 
support and give effect to other 
government programs is not new. 
Indeed, it has been practised in a 
small way for many years. Witness 
the present deviation from the 
concept of purchasing exclusively 
for economy in product cost. 
-However, it is not feasible for 
government purchasing to be used 
simultaneously to support various 
programs with widely differing 
concepts. 68 
67Ibid • 
68Memorandum of C. L. Brown, Director, Purchase 
Research Group, OECD Working Group on Government Purchasing, 
March 5, 1971, p. 13. 
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The introduction of certain socio-economic goals to the 
procurement process may thus be deemed incompatible with 
traditional procurement standards inasmuch as these goals 
act to impede the exercise of control over government 
contracting by frustrating the attainment of the objectives 
of equity and best value. 
It should be noted that some socio-economic goals 
are compatible with the procurement function of government. 
A case in point is the recent federal-provincial agreements, 
whereby the federal government contracts for certain goods 
on behalf of those provinces party to the agreement. The 
primary objectives of the provinces with respect to the 
agreements is to obtain a better price for goods through 
the economies of scale offered by centralized purchasing. 69 
The federal government, through these agreements, helps 
reduce the costs of government for provinces like New 
Brunswick and thus helps to combat regional disparities. 
Thus, it would seem that government procurement should take 
account of national goals, but should contribute to them only 
when other means are not available or feasible. In so 
doing, the objectives of equity and best value would not 
be needlessly undermined. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, three problems pertinent to the 
69A recent example is a contract with Outboard Marine 
Corporation for the supply of outboard engines to the various 
provincial departments, such as the New Brunswick Department 
of the Environment. 
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objectives of control have been examined. The first, cost 
control, was considered in terms of administrative problems 
and financial mismanagement. The former included the 
problem of needs definition, as well as questions concerning 
cost reduction and cost recovery. The latter dealt with 
problems of duplication and inadequate planning. The problem 
of maintaining fairness and justice in the procurement 
system centred on an examination of graft (including conflict 
of interest, misuse of office, bribery, corruption and 
patronage), and the maintenance of equitable administrative 
practices and procedures. In the latter instance it was 
noted that a discrepancy often exists between policy and 
practice. The final problem which was examined was that 
of the introduction of socio-economic goals which were 
incompatible with traditional procurement standards. Two 
examples were considered in this context. One involved 
the promotion of Canadian content in product or goods 
procurement, the other, the promotion of regional equality 
in economic development. Consideration was also given to 
socio-economic goals which were compatible with the 
procurement function of government. It was concluded that 
government contracting should take such goals into account, 
but promote them only when other means are not available or 
feasible. In so doing, the objectives of equity and best 
value will not be needlessly undermined. 
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PART II 
SOURCES OF CONTROL 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOURCES OF CONTROL 
Chapters IV to VII deal with a variety of control 
mechanisms governing federal government contracting in 
Canada. A taxonomy of these sources of control is 
outlined in Table 9 below. 70 
The controls and influences over Canadian federal 
53 
government contracting are divided into four major categories, 
which were chosen on the basis of their function and 
relationship to government. These include parliamentary, 
executive, administrative, and legal and judicial forms of 
control. Each of these categories, and the control 
mechanisms subsumed under it, constitute the basis of one 
of the succeeding four chapters. 
It will be the purpose of the forthcoming chapters 
to examine how the various control mechanisms exercise 
control and to assess their effectiveness in terms of their 
ability to deal with contractual problems and advance the 
objectives of control. These chapters will also put forward 
recommendations as to what steps might be taken to improve 
control over government contracting. 
70The sources of control to be considered in the 
forthcoming chapters are applicable to government control 
over financial administration in a general sense and are 
not exclusive to the area of government contracting. 
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TABLE 9 
Controls and Influences Over Canadian 
Federal Government Contracting 
Major Category 
Parliamentary Controls 
Executive Controls 
Administrative Controls 
Legal and Judicial Forms 
of Control 
71 
Control Mechanism7l 
question period and debate 
parliamentary committees (in 
general) 
the estimates 
the Public Accounts Committee 
the Auditor General 
the Prime Minister 
the Cabinet (including the role 
of individual ministers) 
the Treasury Board Secretariat 
centralization by means of 
common service deparEments 
the determination of levels of 
contractual authority 
the contractual document 
statutory law 
the courts 
No major consideration of pressure groups will be 
undertaken in this study. The reason for this is that the 
activity of interest groups tends to be diffuse and detailed 
information on their operations is not readily available. 
However, references to interest group activity can be found 
at several points in this study. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PARLIAMENTARY CONTROLS 
This chapter explores the basis of parliamentary 
control over government financial administration and examines 
those legislative control mechanisms relevant to a 
consideration of government contracting. These include: 
1) question period and debate 
2) parliamentary committees (in general) 
3) the estimates 
4) the Public Accounts Committee 
5) the Auditor General. 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the effectiveness 
of these control mechanisms with respect to their ability to 
advance the objectives of control. 
The ultimate legal control over all matters of 
financial administration, including contracting, is vested 
in Parliament. Its sovereignty in the area of financial 
affairs stems from two principles. The first is that the 
executive shall have no income other than that sanctioned 
by Parliament. This is to say that all appropriations, 
and all authority to generate revenue must originate in 
the House of Commons. The second principle imposes on the 
executive an accountability for the uses to which monies 
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appropriated by Parliament are applied. This principle 
states that the executive shall not undertake any expenditure 
without the approval of Parliament and shall make expenditures 
only in ways approved by Parliament. 
Parliamentary control over finance assumes that 
Parliament is able to effectively oversee and control the 
activities of the executive branch of government. However, 
this does not appear to be the case. Although Parliament 
has the last word in the process, it does not appear to be 
privy to a great deal of what goes on in ~he administration 
of government. This lack of knowledge tends to relegate 
administrative considerations to the background in favour 
of more generalized policy-oriented concerns. Contractual 
matters tend to be given detailed consideration only when 
graft or financial mismanagement are involved. More often 
than not such issues become fodder for the opposition's 
cannons. Recent examples include the dredging scandal, 
the Lockheed Orion deal and the Skyshops affair. 
One of the primary functions of Parliament is to 
provide a forum in which public g~ievances may be discussed 
and remedies found. To this end, Parliament provides 
opportunities for questions and debate. Two such important 
opportunities are oral question period and opposition days. 
Oral question period is a forty minute period of 
open criticism that the executive is unable to avoid. It 
attracts a large turnout among members of Parliament as it 
offers the possibility of direct participation. The 
57 0,' 
executive is often unaware of what questions will be asked 
and the opposition, for its part, tries to select questions 
that afford them potential political benefit and attract 
press coverage. To this end, "most questions are orchestrated 
for the sole purpose of embarrassing the government."72 
These questions, as they apply to government contracting, 
often tend toward the sensational, concentrating on such 
issues as graft and financial mismanagement. 
Question period73 enables the opposition parties and 
their members to exercise some degree of control over govern-
ment contracting insofar as their efforts, at times, bring 
to light important contractual details which were not 
previously known or considered to any extent. However, the 
information that the opposition uncovers is largely dependent 
on where they choose to look and what questions they choose 
to ask. They are thus put in the role of detective, often 
not knowing what they are looking for or what they will 
uncover. However, their efforts are supplemented by a 
modest research staff. And this research staff has been 
effective in helping reveal the Skyshops affair,74 a 
72R• J. Jackson and M. M. Atkinson, The Canadian 
Legislative System (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), p. 93. 
73 h . h . Anot er 1mportant mec an1sm 
opposition can obtain information are 
(written requests for information). 
through which the 
orders for return 
74The source of this information is a CBC national 
news broadcast, 11 o'clock edition, aired on February I, 
1977. 
58 
-, 
contractual problem involving equity within the procurement 
process. 
The opposition is given a number of opposition days 
in each session of Parliament75 wherein they are free to 
decide the agenda. They are allowed to present motions on 
any matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Parliament 
of Canada. However, "in practice the parties merely divide 
the opposition days among themselves and use the opportunity 
to force debates on topical motions which deplore the govern-
I b h . . f' , 76 ment s e av~our or urge a part~cular course 0 act~on. I 
Even during normal House debates attention is seldom focused 
on administrative matters. 
On those occasions when contractual matters are 
considered by the House, attention tends to centre on 
situations in which graft or financial mismanagement are 
suspected. A case in point is the multi-million dollar 
Terrasses de la Chaudiere project in Hull, undertaken by 
the Department of Public Works. Through the efforts of 
Conservative M.P. Ron Huntington (Capilano) it was revealed 
that the contract had not been subject to public tendering. 77 
75 
The opposition parties are accorded a total of 
25 opposition days (plus 3 days for supplementary estimates) 
per session. These days are designated by the house leaders 
and divided unequally among the three supply periods. 
76Jackson and Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative 
System, p. 94. 
7711conservative MPs Petition Cabinet to Drop Campeau 
Deal", St. Catharines Standard, Nov. 5, 1976, p. 19. 
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The equity of the procurement process had been sacrificed. 
Major discrepancies and inconsistencies relating to contract 
interpretation were also revealed. And the cost of the 
contract was raised as a matter of concern, inferring 
financial mismanagement on the part of the government. 
Mr. Huntington and three other Conservative Members 
of Parliament presented a formal petition to Parliament on 
November 4, 1976 asking that the government cancel the lease-
purchase agreement governing the Terrasses de la Chaudi~re 
project before December 1, 1976 at which time the first 
monies were due from the contractor's bondholders. 78 Prior 
to December 1, 1976, Conservative Members of Parliament rose 
79 
on several occasions pursuant to Standing Order 43 in order 
that the House might vote to cancel the agreement. 80 
However, they failed to obtain the necessary unanimous 
consent of the House. The government continued to deny that 
any problem existed. 
Parliament can be an effective control over government 
contracting in certain cases. As a public forum, it can 
focus public opinion on contractual situations in which the 
objectives of equity and fair value are lacking so that they 
might be realized in subsequent cases. The media is a 
78Ibid • 
79Standing Order 43 is a procedure to bring an 
emergency motion before the House. The unanimous consent 
of the House is needed to proceed. 
80This information was gleaned from Hansard over the 
period November 4 to December 1, 1976. 
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valuable supplement to opposition efforts in this regard. 
It provides a valuable source of information to Members of 
Parliament, as is evidenced by occasions of investigative 
reporting on problems inVOlving government contracting and 
by constant references in the House to information contained 
in 'this morning's newspaper'. As a matter of fact, it was 
a report in the Toronto Daily Star that helped to prompt an 
investigation into the financial mismanagement surrounding 
81 the refit of the aircraft carrier HMCS Bonaventure. By 
continually harping at a minister in the press or in the 
House, opposition members can often help a story unfold, 
whether it is the Skyshops affair or the dredging scandal. 
Indeed, the press coverage accorded the dredging scandal 
prompted the federal government to review and improve its 
dredging contracts in an effort to prevent such fraud in 
82 the future. 
Although it is able to affect the procedures and 
substance of contracting in certain cases, Parliament tends 
to be a relatively ineffectual control over government 
t t ' 83 con rac ~ng. The primary reason for this situation is 
8Icanada News Facts (Toronto: Marpep Publishing, 
1969), p. 244. 
82AS related by A. Macintyre, Group Chief Contracts 
Policy, Treasury Board, Government of Canada, Ottawa, July, 
1976. 
83For a discussion on the general lack of control 
exercised by Parliament see - David Hoffman, "Liaison 
Officers and Ombudsman: Canadian M.P.s and Their Relations 
with the Federal Bureaucracy and Executive," in Thomas A. 
Hockin (editor), Alex of Power (Scarborough, Ontario: 
Prentice-Hall, 197 ), pp. 153-154. 
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that contractual affairs are given little, if any, 
consideration in the day-to-day deliberations of Parliament. 
The opportunities for question and debate, on the whole, 
do not seem to reflect an adequate concern for contractual 
problems. This is perhaps due to the difficulty in obtaining 
information about such matters. Additional research staff 
and further specialization on the part of opposition 
members might help in this respect. 
The second control mechanism to be discussed is 
parliamentary committees. An important function of these 
committees is to oversee the activities of the executive. 
Their role in this regard is limited inasmuch as they can 
act only on that which is referred to them by Parliament. 
Consequently, their activities, with regard to contracting, 
tend to be limited to scrutinizing the estimates of the 
department with which they are concerned. Inquiries tend to 
be of a general nature, reflecting an absence of detailed 
investigation. "Committees meet irregularly and their 
members pose few questions which concern the cost of govern-
ment programs, rarely admonish ministers, and even less 
frequently reduce specific expenditure items. n84 With the 
exception of the Public Accounts Committee, contractual 
matters are seldom discussed in parliamentary committees. 
The following comment by a member of the House 
Standing Committee on Transportation and Communication with 
84Jackson and Atkinson, The Canadian Legislativ~ 
System, p. 89. 
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reference to that committee illustrates why matters of a 
more involved nature, like contracting, are given inadequate, 
if any consideration: 
I must say that as a member of this 
Committee I am very disturbed by 
the inaction of this Committee • • • 
As one who has been sitting on this 
Committee for quite some time, I am 
disturbed to note that we have met 
on only three occasions in this 
particular Parliament, on one occasion 
to table the Minister's statement and 
to hear from the officials of the 
Ministry of Transport. I believe two 
or three of the Committee members at 
that time were given an opportunity 
to ask the Minister some questions 
~egarding this very important depart-
ment. On the other two occasions we 
had the CTC, Mr. Benson and his 
colleagues, appearing before the 
Committee • • • A month has transpired 
and we really have not scratched the 
surface in the examination of these 
particular estimates. We have another 
month to go and by the end of May the 
estimates are deemed to have passed. 85 
This statement reflects the fact that standing committees, 
both in the House and in the Senate, often neglect to 
consider the kind of administr.ative detail which tends to 
surround the contractual activity of government. This is in 
sharp contrast to House and Senate committees in the united 
States which spend a lot of their time examining government 
85Quoting Mr. Mazankowski, House of Commons, 
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee 
on Transport and Communications, second session, 29th 
Parliament, April 25, 1914, pp. 4.4-4.5. 
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procurement activity.86 It would thus appear that most 
parliamentary committees exercise little, if any, control 
over the contractual affairs of government. 
The third control mechanism to be discussed in this 
chapter is the estimates. They represent the government's 
projected spending patterns for the upcoming fiscal year. 
They are important as a control mechanism in two aspects. 
First, they provide the government with centralized control 
over contractual and other departmental expenditures. And 
second, they provide Parliament with the opportunity to 
scrutinize specific government spending proposals. 
The contractual problems most often addressed in 
the preparation of the estimates are those relating to cost 
control. Socio-economic goals may also be given consider-
ation; that is, proposed acquisitions having low priority 
in relation to other government programs and needs may be 
cancelled. Government priorities also play an important 
role in determining the amount and even the nature of 
certain major acquisitions, such as the Lockheed Orion 
purchase. 
The process begins when Treasury Board notifies all 
departments that the estimates for the upcoming year should 
be prepared and submitted. At the departmental level 
86 
An illustration of the amount of time United States 
committees spend on contractual matters is evident from the 
fact that the head United States procurement officer estimates 
that 60% of his time is spent in front of committees. This 
estimate was made by that official in conversation with a source 
who has requested that he be listed as confidential. 
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officials assess their program and operating needs and submit 
a draft of the estimated expenditures to the deputy minister. 
The deputy minister then reviews these estimates in 
consultation with departmental officials. Some items may 
be reconsidered, othezsmay be cut entirely. From here, the 
estimates go to the minister, who may insist on further changes. 
The estimates are then submitted to Treasury Board, where 
they are closely scrutinized. Further cuts are often made 
at this point in consultation with the officials of the 
department concerned. The estimates are then referred to 
the Board itself. Following this, they are approved by 
Cabinet and transmitted to the House of Commons. 
The second and most relevant function of the 
estimates is to afford Parliament an opportunity to 
scrutinize specific government spending proposals. 
Consideration of the estimates is facilitated by the 
presence of comparative data. However, this tends to focus 
discussion on expenditure increases and decreases. 
Once Parliament receives the main estimates, they 
are usually referred at once to the relevant standing 
'tt 87 comm1 ees. The committees have three months to examine 
the estimates. They must report back to the House by May 31, 
at which time the main estimates are deemed to have passed 
pursuant to Standing Order 58(14). The opposition is then 
allocated a number of opposition days in which to debate 
the estimates. The main estimates must be voted on by the 
87House rules state they must be referred before 
March 1. 
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end of June. 
In addition to the main estimates, there are supple-
mentary and final supplementary estimates. The supplementary 
estimates are introduced late in the session. Their purpose 
is to supplement the main estimates by providing for 
contingencies which have occurred since the original 
preparation. They are considered by the standing committees 
and the opposition is given an opportunity to debate them. 
The final supplementary estimates are usually introduced 
just prior to the end of the fiscal year. Their purpose is 
to provide funding for additional items and for monies spent 
but not recovered to that point in time. Many public works 
expenditures that would be suspected of involving patronage 
and normally "denounced by the opposition in Parliament when 
the estimates are discussed and passed . . . are commonly 
placed in the supplementary estimates, where they could be 
slipped through a weary and ill-attended House in the last 
few days of the session.,,88 To comment further in this 
regard: 
It is clear that the greater the use 
which is made of these devices, the 
less appreciation Parliament can have 
of the true financial situation when 
the main estimates are being considered, 
and this ignorance must inevitably be 
accompanied by som~ relinquishing of 
effective control. 9 
88R• MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, 
5th edition, revised by Norman Ward (Toronto: university 
of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 477. 
89Ibid., p. 361. 
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One of the primary tasks of the estimates is to allow 
Parliament to oversee more effectively the operations of the 
government. It would appear that they have not been very 
successful in this regard. With reference to government 
contracting, they do not appear to have contributed much 
in the way of dealing with contractual problems and advancing 
the objectives of control. 
One of the principle parliamentary control mechanisms 
over government contracting is the Public Accounts Committee. 
Its terms of reference enable it to give detailed consideration 
to procurement expenditures. It is a multi-partisan Committee, 
whose chairman has been a member of the opposition since 
1958. In 1969 the Committee's membership was reduced from 
50 to 20, a much more manageable number, and its ability to 
function was thereby enhanced. 
The function of the Committee is to give a detailed 
consideration to the Public Accounts and the Auditor General's 
report90 and make recommendations thereon to the House. The 
House receives these reports but does not ordinarily approve 
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or debate them. This fact imposes a limitation on the 
effectiveness of the Committee as a control mechanism over 
government contracting. It is also important to note that 
Parliament through the Public Accounts Committee is restricted 
90The consideration of the Auditor General's Report 
by the Public Accounts Committee is a relatively recent 
tradition, dating back only as far as World War II. 
91 
Government of Canada, Report of the Independent 
Review Committee on the Office of the Auditor General, 
Ottawa, March, 1975, p. 72. 
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into inquiring whether the monies granted by Parliament have 
been spent in accordance with the votes. The Public Accounts 
Committee is not empowered to encroach on the functions and 
authority of the executive. However, the Committee has not 
interpreted its mandate this conservatively. Rather than 
being concerned solely with the legality of government 
activities, the Committee also considers contractual problems 
involving non-productive payments and inequitable procedures. 
Examples of such inquiries include the Committee's inves-
tigation of financial mismanagement with respect to the 
refit of the aircraft carrier Bonaventure. A more recent 
case is the Committee investigation of graft in the sale of 
nuclear reactors by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., a crown-
owned company. 
It is also the function of the Public Accounts 
Committee to review the annual report of the Auditor General. 
In this capacity the Committee becomes involved in a more 
detailed consideration of government contracting inasmuch as 
the Auditor General's report usually contains a great deal 
of reference to such matters. The Committee's attention is 
thus directed at specific flaws in the spending process. It 
is a criticism of the Committee that it does not centre its 
attention on a consideration of procedures that might be 
adopted to prevent the reoccurrence of such situations, as 
the British Public Accounts Committee does. 92 The Committee 
92H• R. Balls, "The Public Accounts Committee," in 
Canadian Public Administration, VI (1963), March, p. 27. 
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is also plagued by constraints on its members' time, which 
often cause discussion to be limited to a generalized 
consideration of expenditures. These constraints on 
committee members' time are further aggravated by the fact 
that they have very little in the way of research staff. 
The committee is assigned only one part-time researcher 
from the Library of Parliament. Increased specialization 
and expertise among committee members may help overcome 
some of these limitations and enable the Bublic Accounts 
Committee to be an even more effective instrument with 
which to deal with contractual problems and advance the 
objectives of equity and fair value. 
The final parliamentary control mechanism that will 
be considered is the Auditor General. The control over 
government contracting afforded by this source differs from 
the other control mechanisms discussed inasmuch as the 
Auditor General tends to be much more organized and 
systematic in his consideration of the financial affairs 
of government. And the Auditor General, in the course of 
his activities, spends a considerably greater portion of 
his time examining the contractual affairs of government. 
The contractual problems most often identified by him relate 
to questions of cost control, particularly financial mis-
management. Often the only way Parliament and the public are 
made aware of such procurement problems is through his efforts. 
Prior to 1969 the efforts of the Auditor General 
were supplemented by audits and examinations undertaken prior 
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to any payment by the Comptroller of the Treasury. It was 
his job to refuse payment if it: 
1) was not a lawful charge against an appropriation 
2) was in excess of an appropriation 
3) would reduce the balance of funds so as to prevent 
meeting future commitments. 
In 1969 the position of Comptroller of the Treasury was 
abolished and the responsibility for preaudit transferred 
to the departments. This deprived the Auditor General of a 
valuable counterpart capable of dealing effectively with 
cost control problems. 
The Auditor General, as an ex post facto control over 
the financial affairs of government, provides the government 
with an opportunity to recover misappropriated funds. 
However, his main purpose is not to reveal all the faults 
of government and provide for restitution, but to reveal 
enough faults to deter those who handle money and accounts 
from making mistakes and conducting themselves improperly. 
To this end, Section 61(1) of the Financial Administration 
Act requires that the Auditor General call attention to 
every case in which he has observed that: 
(i) any appropriation was exceeded 
or was applied to a purpose or 
in a manner not authorized by 
Parliament, 
(ii) an expenditure that was not 
authorized or was not properly 
vouched or certified. 93 
93"Extracts from the Financial Administration Act," 
in Government of Canada, Report of the Independent Review 
Committee of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 
p. 2'. 
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It should be noted that the Auditor General's work 
is supposed to be limited to revealing and documenting 
violations of existing regulations; for he is not to intrude 
or comment upon the functions and responsibilities of the 
executive. However, Section 61 of the Financial Administration 
Act provides a catch-all phrase governing those things on 
which the Auditor General may comment. It reads: 
• • • and any other case that he 
considers should be brought to 
the notice of the House of Commons. 94 
Acting pursuant to this phrase Auditor General Sellar 
reported for the first time in 1958 on what he termed 
"non-productive payments". Since then a tradition has 
developed whereby the Auditor General has come to inquire 
into whether value for money has been received, inasmuch 
as inefficiency and waste become apparent from time to timey 
through the examination of payments. The inquiry into 
whether value for money was received addresses itself to 
three questions: 
1) was the money spent economically? 
2) was the money spent efficiently? 
3) was the expenditure effective in meeting its objectives? 
These questions are particularly relevant to government 
contracting insofar as procurement needs tend to be tangible 
and subject to quantification. The importance of such 
inquiries to government procurement becomes evident when 
94 
Ibid. 
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one considers that a great deal of attention is focused 
on one of the key objectives of control over government 
contracting, the attainment of fair value. 
An example of the effectiveness of the Auditor 
General in pursuing the objective of fair value may be seen 
in a case involving the Yukon Aircraft. 95 The Auditor 
General requested the file on this aircraft prior to its 
being phased out of operation. He discovered that, prior 
to the decision to phase the plane out of service, a problem 
which constituted a safety hazard had been discovered in 
the wheels. Replacement parts had been contracted for. By 
the time the contract had been carried out the aircraft was 
already being phased out of service. Consequently, the 
government ended up with more spare wheels than they had 
use for. The planners had not been able to forecast 
correctly their requirements. The Auditor General in the 
hope of discouraging future occurrences of the same or 
similar situations, talked to those concerned about the 
problem, but did not comment on it in his report. 
The Auditor General has substantial resources which 
he can apply to the task of obtaining information, but his 
main problem is in the selection of areas for examination. 
He and his staff cannot be everywhere at once. His effective-
ness as a control mechanism thus hinges on his ability to 
instill in the bureaucracy an apprehension about where he 
95source confidential, Ottawa, July, 1976. 
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will strike and which file he will call for. And he seems 
to have failed to present to the bureaucracy an ever-looming 
h . 96 and menacing presence that would keep them on t e1r toes. 
His effectiveness also depends very largely on the extent to 
which the Public Accounts Committee follows up on his reports. 
The Auditor General's effectiveness as a control 
mechanism over government contracting is subject to two 
further limitations. The first involves an inability to 
discover certain cases in which contractual authority has 
. d 97. . f h been exceeded. In certa1n epartments 1t 1S 0 ten t e 
case that individuals acting outside their authority orally 
commit the government to contracts, which are approved on 
paper at a later date by superiors at an appropriate level 
of authority.98 The Auditor General is unable to uncover 
such problems through an examination of departmental records 
and files. The second limitation upon the effectiveness of 
the Auditor General is his failure to create an effective 
liaison with the Treasury Board, whose function it is to 
manage and co~dinate matters of financial administration 
within the government. Without such a link the government 
96 h' . . b d h h" . f T 1S p01nt 1S ase on t e aut or s lrnpreSS10ns 0 
civil servants' attitudes toward the Auditor General obtained 
during numerous interviews in which the Auditor General's 
relation to government contracting was discussed. 
97This occurs frequently with respect to ship over-
haul and repair contracts, as the business is traditionally 
carried on by word of mouth. 
98As related by J. Mo~gan, Marine and Ferry Branch, 
Department of Transport, Government of Canada, Ottawa, 
August, 1976. 
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is handicapped in its effort to develop procedures that 
would prevent the reoccurrence of a given problem. However, 
the unprecedented action in 1974 wherein the Treasury Board 
d99 . d ·1 h d· I' 1973 commente 1n eta1 on t e Au 1tor Genera s report 
is encouraging. If it is continued, a vital link will have 
been created between two of the most important financial 
control mechanisms in government. 
In summary, parliamentary controls over government 
contracting, with the exception of the Public Accounts 
Committee and the Auditor General, do not appear to be very 
effective with respect to uncovering contractual problems 
and advancing the objectives of control. The success of 
even the most effective parliamentary control mechanism 
seemed to be subject to a good deal of random chance. The 
problems most often addressed by these control mechanisms 
were those relating to cost control and the maintenance 
of fairness and justice in the procurement process. More 
specifically, the problems most commonly referred to were 
those involving financial mismanagement and graft. The 
problem of socio-economic goals which are incompatible with 
traditional procurement standards was not directly discussed, 
although socio-economic goals were considered in the context 
of relating government priorities to procurement needs. 
In order to increase the effectiveness of 
99 Government of Canada, Report of the Independent 
Review Commietee on the Office of the Auditor General of 
Canada, p. 72. 
.1 
parliamentary control over government contracting certain 
steps should be considered: 
1) opposition days should be used primarily for debate on 
the estimates rather than on topical motions as is now 
the case, 
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2) the opposition should be provided with increased staff, 
and administrative specialization among members should 
be encouraged in order that the difficulties with respect 
to obtaining information about government contracting may 
be overcome, 
3) committees should be encouraged to develop specialization 
and expertise within their ranks and make more use of 
their investigative powers, 
4) action should be taken to curb the abuses to which the 
final supplementary estimates are subject, 
5) the Public Accounts Committee should be provided with 
research staff to aid it in obtaining information, and it 
should be encouraged to direct its attention to a 
consideration of procedures that might be adopted to 
prevent the reoccurrence of a contractual problem, 
6) the House should be required to debate and approve the 
report of the Public Accounts Committee, rather than 
shelve it as currently appears to be the case, and 
7) action should be taken to instill in the civil service 
an increased apprehension as to whether they might be 
subject to an investigation by the Auditor General. 
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CHAPTER V 
EXECUTIVE CONTROLS 
This chapter deals with executive controls over 
government contracting. Executive controls encompass those 
control mechanisms of a non-legislative and non-judicial 
nature which are administered by the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet. They include a consideration of the roles of the 
Prime Minister, the Cabinet (including the role of individual 
Ministers) and the Treasury Board Secretariat. It will be 
the aim of this chapter to consider the effectiveness of 
these control mechanisms in terms of their ability to 
enhance the objectives of control. 
The Prime Minister is generally not considered to 
be an effective control mechanism in the area of government 
contracting. It is usually the case that issues of a 
contractual nature, short of developing into an issue of 
political consequence or a potential scandal, are not deemed 
important enough to reach his desk or to be considered by 
his staff. However, the Prime Minister does exercise some 
control over major contracting matters. For instance, late 
in 1976 the Prime Minister decided on a PCO task force 
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recommendationlOO with respect to the division of contracting 
responsibility between the Post Office and the Department of 
Supply and Services. 10l In so doing, he attempted to intro-
duce a greater degree of co-ordination into the procurement 
process. It was hoped that such action would contribute to 
the attainment of better value in government contracting. 
Another example of the Prime Minister's efforts in 
the area of government contracting involves his participation 
in the Lockheed Orion affair. A dispute had developed in 
Cabinet between James Richardson, Minister of National 
Defence and Jean Pierre Goyer, Minister of Supply and 
Services. The disagreement arose following Lockheed's 
failure to borrow the necessary money for interim financing 
of the project. The argument centred on whether or not the 
government would step in and provide interim financing or 
let the project collapse. The Prime Minister acted as 
intermediary in the dispute l02 which was finally resolved 
by extending the length of the program. The result of this 
compromise was to reduce the total cost of the contract by 
32 million dollars and save $108 million dollars in interest 
100 
As related by B. Vienot, Administrative Services 
and Purchasing, Post Office, Government of Canada, Ottawa, 
August, 1976. 
101 
The exact details of the decision are being kept 
secret but it appears that the decision favoured the 
Department of Supply and Services. 
102 
Source confidential. Also see - Canada News Facts, 
May 16-31, 1976, p. 1579. 
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charges. The Prime Minister's efforts thus contributed 
to the government's ability to deal effectively with a cost 
control problem and thereby advance the objective of best 
value. 
The Cabinet plays a larger and seemingly more important 
role in the contractual affairs of government than does the 
Prime Minister alone. Under Section 54 of the British North 
America Act it is responsible for initiating all financial 
legislation. And as the body charged with spending government 
funds, it has a responsibility to try to devise ways and 
means to restrain and reduce government expenditure. It can 
do so through a detailed consideration of contract expen-
ditures, particularly those involving a large outlay of 
government resources, and through its ability to co-ordinate 
departmental activities and thereby reduce duplication and 
waste in contractual and other matters. 
The Cabinet also exercises control over government 
contracting by issuing directives on such things as socio-
economic goals that it would like to see promoted with the 
aid of government contracting. For example, the Cabinet has 
considered the use of government procurement as a viable 
means with which to solve certain problems in federal 
penitentiaries. To this end, they have sought ideas on what 
sort of things prisoners could manufacture. One cannot help 
but ask whether such a policy would afford the government 
103Canada News Facts, July 1-31, 1976, p. 1602. 
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best value for its dollar both in terms of alternate sources 
of supply for a given product and in terms of future savings 
in penitentiary-related programs. Such a policy would also 
run counter to considerations of equity insofar as it would 
have the effect of excluding, in whole or in part, the 
suppliers of the good selected for prison production from 
competition for government contracts in this area. 
The Cabinet spends a great deal of time enacting 
subordinate legislation known as minutes or orders-in-
council. Each year several thousand orders-in-council are 
104 issued for the purpose of approving supply contracts 
requiring the approval of the Governor-in-council. l05 
Through its direct approval of various types of contracts, 
the Cabinet serves as a control over certain matters of 
government procurement. However, despite a large support 
staff, the Cabinet finds itself congested with such business 
and unable to devote sufficient time to more important 
contractual matters. 
The ability of Cabinet to act as an effective control 
over government contracting is limited in two further respects. 
First, ministers are subject to constraints on their time. 
In addition to their Cabinet duties, they serve in Parliament, 
have constituency responsibilities and are responsible for 
104 Dawson, The Government of Canada, p. 213. 
105 
Examples of contracts requiring the approval of 
the Governor-in-Council include any contract with the 
National Harbours Board and in the area of revenue contracting, 
the leasing of a Crown owned vessel to an outside agency. 
the administration of their portfolios. And secondly, it 
is often the case that ministers are poorly informed on 
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many administrative matters. As a result Cabinet directives 
are at times vague and ineffectual. 106 
A measure of control over contractual affairs is also 
vested in individual ministers. It is their task to run the 
department for which they are responsible as effectively and 
as efficiently as possible and to ensure that the goals of 
equity and best value are maintained in the procurement 
activities of their department. Consider the following 
example of how the Minister of Supply and Services upheld 
the objective of equity in his department's contracting 
activities. 107 A large electronics manufacturer refused to 
assume any product performance liability in its contracts 
with the government. When it came time to discuss the 
government's insistence that it do so, company representatives 
refused to speak to anyone short of the minister concerned, 
with whom they did indeed speak. After consultation with 
department officials, the minister sustained the government's 
position that it would not give up its rights at law in the 
166 
An illustration of such vagueness is a Cabinet 
directive on regional development stating that the government 
should purchase from economically depressed provinces when-
ever possible in order to bolster their economies. By the 
term "whenever possible", Cabinet implies that if all things 
are equal a supplier from an economically depressed region 
should be selected. All factors are rarely, if ever, equal 
and conseq~ently the directive does not seem to change 
existing contracting procedures. 
107 f'd' 1 1976 Sources con 1 ent1a , August, • 
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event of a law suit on the liability issue. By not making 
an exception in this case, the minister upheld the objective 
of equity in the procurement process. 
Although individual ministers may at times act as an 
effective control over government contracting, they often do 
not have the time to inform themselves on everything that is 
going on in their departments, particularly with regard to 
administrative matters. When asked detailed questions in 
the House or in committees they often rely on departmental 
personnel to coach them in their answers. And it is often 
the case that ministers become aware of problems within their 
departments too late in the game. Such was the case with 
the Bonaventure and Lockheed contracts. Both developed into 
full blown political issues. The ability of individual 
ministers to affect the procedures and substance of 
contracting within their departments is thus dependent upon 
their attention being called to a procurement problem. Only 
after identifying the problem is the minister able to direct 
attention within his department to the task of preventing 
the relevant objectives of control from being undermined 
any further. 
A very important executive control over federal 
government contracting is the Treasury Board Secretariat. 
The Treasury Board is a Committee of Cabinet composed of 
the President of the Treasury Board, the Minister of Finance 
and four other Ministers and their alternates. It has a 
supporting secretariat, which is considered to be a department 
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of government, that consists of a deputy head and a number 
of deputy secretaries in charge of the five organizational 
branches. The two branches most relevant to government 
contracting are the program branch, which deals with 
program expenditures, and the administrative policy branch 
which deals with guidelines and directives concerning travel 
and contract policies. 
Also of particular importance to contractual matters 
is the Treasury Board's Interdepartmental Committee on 
Contracts established in 1950 by the direction of Cabinet 
pursuant to a Treasury Board recommendation. Its membership 
consists of senior civil servants from those departments, 
such as Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Public 
Works, Supply and Services and National Defence, which under-
take a substantial amount of contractual activity. "The 
terms of reference of the Committee are to review existing 
procurement and contractual policies, practices and procedures, 
to report to Cabinet on these policies, practices and procedures 
and to make such recommendations as seem appropriate in the 
light of the circumstances found to exist.,,108 The Committee 
has in the past addressed itself to such considerations as 
the establishment of a centralized procurement agency and 
the economies inherent therein. It has also concerned itself 
with the important task of consolidating contracting procedures 
and introducing some degree of uniformity into them. Among 
108 
D. R. McLellan, Canadian Government Procurement 
(Contracts) (Ottawa: Treasury Board, August 1, 1956), 
p. X-I. 
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its major accomplishments is its contribution to the 
development of a standard construction contract. 
The Treasury Board has two important roles with 
respect to government contracting. It acts as the Cabinet 
committee on expenditure and as the Cabinet committee on 
109 
management. In the former capacity it attempts to; 
1) relate expenditures to government priorities and broad 
policy objectives, 
2) assess the effectiveness of various programs in achieving 
those objectives, and 
3) assess the efficiency with which these programs are 
administered. 
In assessing government expenditures, the Treasury Board 
gives a great deal of consideration to how procurement needs, 
particularly large capital outlays, correspond to government 
objectives and national goals. A particularly close 
relationship exists between Treasury Board and the Cabinet 
Committee on Priorities and Planning. 110 Documents are 
frequently exchanged and the Secretariat usually has 
representatives present at Cabinet committee meetings. 
The function of the Treasury Board as Cabinet 
committee on management is to establish guidelines and 
regulations to constrain government expenditure. It does 
l09A• W. Johnson, "The Treasury Board of Canada and 
the Machinery of Government in the 1970s," in Canadian 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (1971), No.3, pp. 346-366. 
110 'd 353 Ibl. ., p. • 
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so by placing constraints on government inputs. These 
constraints include regulations that determine such things 
as office space allotments, standards of equipment and 
procurement requirements. Such constraints act to ensure 
economy in government contracting. Another form of constraint 
is designed to ensure honesty in the operation of government. 
In this regard the Treasury Board develops regulations which 
act to help ensure public accountability and equitable 
treatment in government contracting. 
Treasury Board control over government contracting 
also takes the form of policy controls. These are statements 
of intent by the government in reference to certain aspects 
of procurement. A good example would be the Treasury Board 
statement contained at the end of Chapter II, which outlines 
the objectives of control over government contracting. 
Another example is the policy of the government not to sell 
111 
real property. Only in exceptional circumstances does 
the government sell its property, even if it is not needed. 
However, the government will trade land and this is done 
frequently, especially with the Province of Ontario. In the 
research, development and natural sciences area the govern-
ment has what might be termed a buy pOlicy.112 Rather than 
undertake scientific research itself the government will 
lllAS related by A. Macintyre, Group Chief Contracts 
Policy, Treasury Board, Government of Canada, Ottawa, July, 
1976. 
112 
Ibid. 
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contract out to have the work done. Indeed, in this area 
the government often accepts unsolicited bids for mission-
oriented scientific work. 
The ability of the Treasury Board to exert control 
over the financial affairs of government is further supple-
mented by its role in the budgetary cycle. It has the 
opportunity to review specific departmental expenditure 
proposals before they are sent to the appropriate functional 
committee for consideration. Changes in expenditure proposals 
result only after consultation with the department concerned. 
However, as with all activities of the Treasury Board, such 
changes are subject to correction and further amendment by 
the government. 
The primary method the Treasury Board employs to 
exercise control over government procurement is the 
bottleneck technique. 113 On all those contracts requiring 
Treasury Board approval, the Treasury Board can and does 
reserve the right to withhold approval if a department does 
not choose to follow their guidelines and recommendations 
on contracting procedures. In choosing the bottleneck 
technique as a control mechanism, the Treasury Board 
considered two other types of control. One system they 
considered was a post-audit as occurs in the Province of 
Ontario. However, they felt that this occurred too late in 
113 h . f' . d . h' h' h T e 1n ormat10n conta1ne W1t 1n t 1S paragrap 
was related by A. Macintyre, Group Chief Contracts Policy, 
Treasury Board, Government of Canada, Ottawa, July, 1976. 
85 
the process. The other system that was considered was that 
employed in the United States, whereby the federal government 
maintains a detailed set of contract regulations. The 
Treasury Board felt that the United States' system would 
cause too many red tape delays and its rigidity would allow 
less discretion. Already criticized for being too slow in 
coming to decisions, the Treasury Board did not want to 
aggravate this situation further. 
The Treasury Board is also able to exercise control 
over government procurement through its ability to gain 
access to all departments and agencies in order that it 
might inquire as to how a department is doing its job. The 
means that are commonly employed to get this information 
are task forces, post-audit sampling and detailed studies 
into specific aspects of a department's operations. Such 
a detailed study occurred as a result of the dredging 
114 
scandal. The Treasury Board selected a number of people 
from the major departments concerned and came up with a few 
minor policy changes which would aid departments in obtaining 
information from the dredging companies with which they were 
dealing. They also introduced penalties for the non-
disclosure of information. One such penalty would reduce 
the award of a contract by 10% if incorrect information had 
been given. Of course, discretion was to be used in applying 
114 
As related by A. Macintyre, Group Chief Contracts 
Policy, Treasury Board, Government of Canada, Ottawa, July, 
1976. 
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any such penalties. Having tackled the problem on a short-
term basis, Treasury Board then formed an interdepartmental 
committee to look at all dredging contracts over $100,000,115 
with the aim of developing a long-term policy on dredging 
contracts and preventing the recurrence of graft. 
The Treasury Board Secretariat is an important 
control over government contracting, but its effectiveness 
is limited with respect to matters of government procurement 
by the sheer size of government and by the large number of 
departments and agencies with which it must deal. Indeed, 
in October of 1975 the Treasury Board found it necessary to 
delegate increased contractual approval authority to 
departments in order to reduce the large number of contracts 
to which it had to give approval. 116 The effectiveness of 
Treasury Board as a control mechanism is even further 
complicated by the fact that it reserves unto itself far 
less approval authority than it delegates. Consequently, it 
rarely sees contracts that are below a department's contract 
approval ceiling. Apart from random sampling, the Treasury 
Board has little control over how contracting authority is 
. exercised. 
Treasury Board often finds itself functioning as an 
ex post facto control. For instance, there is a case in 
115 It was assumed that any contract award under 
$100,000 would not produce sufficient gains and thereby 
not provide an incentive to cheat. 
l16AS related by A. Macintyre, Group Chief Contracts 
Policy, Treasury Board, Government of Canada, Ottawa, July, 
1976. 
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which a department, due to departmental error, awarded a 
contract and only later discovered that they had misplaced 
what turned out to be the low bid. Finding themselves in a 
mess, they turned to Treasury Board for help.117 Another 
example of the ineffectiveness of Treasury Board as a 
control over government contracting is the way in which it 
handled the Lockheed Orion affair. The original deal fell 
apart when the government reversed itself and decided it 
would not provide the cash Lockheed had failed to borrow 
from Canadian chartered banks. Ideally, Treasury Board 
should have been able to discover earlier in the process 
that there were no monies appropriated to finance initial 
work on the project. This could have prevented a case of 
financial mismanagement resulting in the government being 
liable for 16 million dollars already spent on special 
d . 118 stu ~es. These examples help illustrate the often ad hoc 
basis of Treasury Board control and the need for more 
consistency in its operations, if it is to be more effective 
in developing procedures that will promote the attainment 
of equity, fair value and national goals in and by means of 
the procurement process. 
In summary, executive controls over government 
contracting address the entire range of contractual 
problems, but vary in their ability to advance the 
l17Ibid • 
l18The 16 million dollars was subsequently saved by 
the signing of a new contract on July 21, 1976. 
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objectives of control. The Prime Minister tends to become 
involved in contractual matters only when they are issues 
which involve scandal or are of political consequence. In 
the latter case, he is sometimes called upon to mediate 
departmental disputes involving questions of cost control 
and financial mismanagement. 
The contractual problems most often addressed by 
Cabinet relate to cost control. These are usually examined 
in the context of reducing departmental expenditures, as 
work load and time constraints tend to prevent a more com-
prehensive examination of contractual problems. It should 
also be noted that Cabinet sometimes interferes with the 
objectives of equity and best value by introducing socio-
economic goals which may not be consistent with the procure-
ment function of government. However, these socio-economic 
directives are at times too vague to change existing 
contractual policies and practices. 
The control over government contracting exercised 
by individual ministers tends to centre on the objectives 
of equity and best value. More specifically, they tend to 
concentrate on questions concerning cost control and the 
fairness of contractual procedures. Ministers do not usually 
have the time to consider administrative matters and are 
often unaware of contractual problems within their depart-
ments, as is evidenced by the Lockheed and Bonaventure affairs. 
The Treasury Board Secretariat deals with a wide 
range of contractual problems, including cost control, 
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financial mismanagement, graft and the maintenance of 
equitable administrative practices and procedures. It 
also relates procurement needs to government priorities 
and socio-economic goals. In this context, socio-economic 
goals tend to be consistent with the procurement function 
of government. The effectiveness of Treasury Board as a 
control over government contracting is limited by the ad 
hoc manner in which control is exercised. The only 
systematic basis of control is provided by the bottleneck 
technique, which is subject to a number of limitations. 
The other control devices, task forces, post-audit sampling 
and detailed studies, often occur too late in the process 
and serve only as ex post facto controls. 
The following recommendations might be considered as 
means by which the effectiveness of executive control over 
government contracting might be increased: 
1) The authority to approve supply contracts presently 
requiring the approval of the Governor-in-Council should 
be transferred to the Treasury Board Secretariat. It 
seems unlikely that Cabinet gives any detailed consideration 
to such contracts and their pro forma consideration would 
appear to be a waste of Cabinet's time. 
2) Treasury Board should develop more comprehensive and 
systematic means by which to review government contracting 
procedures and practices. It should attempt to identify 
problems early on in the procurement process and introduce 
corrective procedures. In this regard, it might be 
beneficial if the Treasury Board Secretariat developed a 
closer liaison with the Office of the Auditor General. 
90 
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CHAPTER VI 
AmUNIsrrRATIVE CONTROI .. S 
This chapter considers administrative forms of 
control. This entails an examination of some of the major 
government departments involved in the procurement field and 
the techniques that they employ to exercise control over 
government contracting. These techniques include: 
1) the centralization of the government procurement function 
in common service departments; 
2) the determination of levels of contractual authoritYi and 
3) the use of the contractual document as a means by which 
to protect government interests. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to assess these techniques 
in terms of their ability to deal with contractual problems 
and thereby advance certain objectives of control. 
Within the last decade, the government procurement 
function has become increasingly centralized. This is 
evidenced by the increased role common service departments 
play in administering government procurement activities. 
Unlike other departments, who concern themselves primarily 
with 'getting things done', common service departments have 
a control function as their primary concern. 
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The effectiveness of common service departments in 
exercising control over government procurement activities is 
largely dependent on the development of contractual expertise. 
Such expertise evolves from specialization and is often 
supplemented by policy review groups, whose function it is 
to monitor and evaluate contractual practices and procedures 
and deal with such procurement problems as become apparent 
from time to time. Expertise in government contracting 
develops slowly and is often adversely affected by government 
reorganizations, which shuffle experienced manpm'ler away from 
the procurement field. The Department of Public Works has 
been hit particularly hard in this respect. Continual 
reorganizations and an abnormally high turnover rate have 
left the contracting branch of that department \vith a 
perpetual shortage of experienced personnel. 119 
The ability of common service departments to deal 
with contractual problems is limited in many respects. For 
instance, the Minister of Supply and Services has the 
responsibility for ensuring that the objectives of best value 
and equity are met in goods procurement. But how does he 
know whether the government is receiving best value for its 
money, when he doesn't use the goods that he supplies? And 
how can he guarantee equity in goods procurement when 
suppliers are often pre-determined by way of single source 
related by S. Ings, Contract Policy and 
Administration, Department of Public ~Jorks, Government of 
Canada, Ottawa, July, 1976. 
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requisitions? 
The sort of problems that common service departments 
tend to focus on are those involving cost control and the 
maintenance of equitable procedures and practices. To this 
end, they contribute toward the attainment of the primary 
objectives of control, equity and best value. However, 
departments are not always obligated to make use of common 
service departments. In the case of the Department of Public 
Works, departments are encouraged but not forced (depending 
on their level of contractual authority) to avail themselves 
of that department's construction talents. 
Administrative control over government contracting 
can also be seen in terms of levels of authority. In this 
context, administrative control addresses the problem of 
cost control and thereby helps advance a key objective of 
control, the attainment of best value. 
Authority levels vary depending on the nature of the 
acquisition and the department concerned. Table 10 gives 
a breakdown of authority by department for construction, 
goods, non-consulting and consulting service contracts. 
Any amount in excess of the figures presented in Table 10 
must first be approved by Treasury Board. 
One will note that the contractual authority of 
common service departments is relatively high in comparison 
to other departments. To the extent that other departments 
exceed their authority they must make use of the services 
of such bodies as the Department of Supply and Services and 
the Department of Public Works. It is in this way that common 
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TABLE 10120 
contractual Authority Levels of Departments 
Type of 
Contract 
Construction 
Goods 
Non-consulting 
services 
Consulting 
services 
Contracting 
Agency 
DPW 
DCL 
lAND 
other depts. 
DSS 
other depts. 
DSS 
MOT 
DPW 
other depts. 
DSS 
Other depts. 
Maximum non-
competitive 
authority 
(without 
Treasury Board 
approval) 
$100,000 
$100,000 
$100,000 
$ 15,000 
$500,000 
$ 15,000 
$500,000 
$ 50,000 
$ 50,000 
$ 25,000 
$ 35,000 
$ 25,000 
DSS - Department of Supply and Services 
DPW - Department of Public Works 
DCL - Defence Construction (1951) Ltd. 
MOT - Ministry of Transport 
Maximum 
competitive 
authority 
(without 
Treasury Board 
approval) 
$2,500,000a 
$l,250,OOOa 
$ 250,OOOa 
$ 100,000a 
$l,Ooo,oooa 
$ 50,000a 
$1,000,000~ 
$ 250,000b 
$ 200,000b 
$ 50,000 
70,000c $ 
$ 50,000c 
lAND - Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
aTwo or more valid tenders must be received, they must be 
firm price contracts, the lowest must be accepted. 
bTWO or more valid tenders must be received and the lowest 
accepted - it need not be a firm price contract. 
CAt least three proposals must be considered. 
120This table was constructed from information 
contained in: Government of Canada, Government Contract 
Regulations, Financial Administration Act, P.C. 1975 - 2042, 
August 27, 1975. 
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service departments exercise a degree of control over 
government contracting. 
The government actively encourages the use of common 
service departments, as is evidenced by the following 
Treasury Board statement: 
In those areas, where the interests 
of overall economy and efficiency 
in government can best be met by 
the centralized acquisition of goods 
and services or the centralized 
carrying out of construction and 
leasing, it is the policy of the 
Government of Canada to direct 
procurement through a common service 
agency. For such centralization to 
be effective, close cooperation is 
required between the common service 
agency and its client departments. 12l 
With respect to goods procurement, there exist three 
conditions under which departments are encouraged to 
contract directly. The first is if a purchase is less than 
$100. The Department of Supply and Services doesn't want to 
be bothered with such small amounts. The second condition 
is if an emergency exists. And the final condition is if the 
goods are of a unique character such as those used in some 
types of scientific research. The Post Office has chosen to 
give wide interpretation to the word unique so as to meet its 
specialized needs. Consequently, the Department of Supply 
and Services and the Post Office have been at odds with each 
other since the creation of the Department of Supply and 
121 
Government of Canada, Treasury Board, Administrative 
Policy Branch, Policy and Guidelines on Contracting in the 
Government of Canada, Ottawa, June, 1975, p. 7. 
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Services in 1969. The delegation of contracting 
authority in goods procurement can also be achieved by means 
of a national master standing offer that departMents can call 
. 123 
up aga1.nst. 
A minister exercises the ultimate contracting 
authority within his department but may choose to delegate 
it to his subordinates. A Department of Supply and Services 
reference manual defines contract approval authority for 
that department in the following way: 
Contract approval authority is the 
authority delegated by the Minister 
to the incumbent of a position to 
approve submissions to enter into 
contracts, contract amendments or 
standing offers up to specified 
dollar limits subject to applicable 
legislation, regulations, ~onditions, 
policies and guideline~ in effect 
at such time. 124 
At the lower tiers in the administrative hierarchy 
there exists very little in the way of discretionary 
authority. More is needed. A case in point is a situation 
where a large government survey crew had to stop work and 
l22A 1 t d b B' , dm'" s re a e y • V1.enot, D1.rector, A 1.n1.strat1.ve 
Services and Purchasing Branch, Post Office, Government of 
Canada, Ottawa, August, 1976. 
123 '1 'f ' A nat1.ona master stand1.ng of er 1.S where, for 
example, the D,epartment of Supply and Services contracts 
for typewriters and the departments can purchase the number 
they need during the term of the contract by simply calling 
up the supplier and ordering them. A call-up against a 
standing offer constitutes a contract. 
124 
Confidential and unpublished material, Department 
of Supply and Services, August 1976. 
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wait for approval for a chainsaw requisition in order to 
d h " h "d" h" 125 cut own a tree w 1C was 1mpe 1ng t e1r progress. One 
need only ask if the wasted man hours were worth the red 
tape encountered in acquiring the chainsaw. The reluctance 
of civil servants to challenge the government with respect 
to the need for increased discretionary authority appears 
to stem from fear of engaging in what might be called 
, " " " "' 126 career 11m1t1ng act10ns • 
A public servant may start with high expectations 
of getting things done. However, after a number of his 
ideas are rejected, he becomes more realistic and acutely 
aware of how the bureaucracy functions. 
He is able to reduce his failure 
rate: he reduces the number of 
his ideas which are shot down by 
reducing the number proposed. 
So "improvement" is accomplished 
by reducing the number of things 
he tries to do - by reducing the 
amount Of change he seeks to bring 
about. 127 
Graphically the process of becoming an experienced bureaucrat 
could look as follows: 
125 f"d" 1 0 1976 Source con 1 ent1a, ttawa, August, • 
126 h"" h h'" " T 1S not1on represents t e aut or s 1mpress1ons 
following numerous interviews with public servants. 
127 
R. Fisher, International Conflict for Beginners 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 186. 
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Becoming an Experienced Bureaucrat 
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One of the most effective administrative forms 
of control over government contracting is the contractual 
document. The reason for this seems to be that federal 
priorities are on entering into a contract as opposed to 
administering it. The nature, terms and conditions of a 
contract usually emphasize the objective of best value. 
They do so by addressing the problem of cost control. In 
this regard, the contractual document acts to protect the 
Crown's interests. However, it is quite another thing to 
follow through and ensure that contractual arrangements 
have been lived up to. 
As Table 11 illustrates, there are numerous 
types of contracts the government can enter into: 
l28Ibid • 
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TABLE 11 
Types of Contracts 
Firm Price a) competitive 
b) negotiated 
Cost Reimbursable a) cost plus a fixed fee 
b) cost plus a fixed fee with 
a swing feature 
Target Price 
Lease Purchase 
Revenue 
There are two kinds of firm price contract; 
competitive and negotiated. A contract may be described 
as competitive when two or more valid tenders from different 
sources have been received and where it is assumed that 
competition has held cost and profit to reasonable levels. 
Whenever possible, the reasonableness of the price in a 
129 
negotiated (single source) contract must be supported 
by a cost and profit breakdown. The firm price type of 
contract may also serve as the basis of a national master 
standing offer. This is a contractual agreement between 
129 
Thirty-five percent of supply contracts in the 
Department of Supply and Services are single source 
requisitions. Sixty percent of the Department of Supply 
and Services' contracts are thought to be non-competitive. 
These estimates are thought to be conservative. Source 
confidential, Ottawa, August, 1976. 
Joe Priddle of the Contracts Settlement Board of the 
Department of Supply and Services estimates that 90% of his 
department's contracts are negotiated, when considered on a 
value basis. 
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the Department of Supply and Services and a company whereby 
a government department or agency is free to requisition 
directly from the company at a predetermined price the goods 
covered in the agreement. A call up against such an offer 
would constitute a contract. 
There are also two forms of cost reimbursable 
contract. The first is cost plus a fixed fee, which is 
usually determined by negotiation on a range basis. This 
means that a certain range of percentages, estimated on the 
basis of the value of the contract, are considered in the 
negotiations to fix a fee. The cost plus fixed fee contract 
with a swing feature is the type of contract that applies 
to unknown circumstances. For example, a Crown ship may 
have to undergo repairs and the exact extent of damages or 
the nature of the problem are not known. Consequently, an 
estimate is made and a fixed fee attached to it. If the 
repair is larger than anticipated, the two parties will sit 
down and renegotiate the contract. Similarly, if the problem 
is not as great as anticipated a refund might be negotiated. 
Target price contracts include three components: 
a fixed fee, an incentive and a ceiling. The incentive is 
applicable when the contract falls below its estimated 
target cost. The incentive may stand on its own or may have 
a penalty associated with it. This allows the government to 
transfer risk to the contractor. An incentive is usually 
arrived at by gut feeling during the negotiations. It is a 
question of how much the government contracting officer can 
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get away with. One might provide an incentive of 20 cents 
for each dollar saved under the amount of the target price. 
Similarly, the government in its desire to transfer risk to 
the other party may pay only 80 cents toward every dollar 
of cost between the target cost and the ceiling. The 
contractor would have to absorb the 20 cents penalty. 
Performance and delivery incentives may also be included 
in such contracts. 
The lease purchase agreement was developed as a 
matter of expediency and as a result of capital expenditure 
restrictions. The purpose of a lease purchase contract is 
to avoid tying up a lot of capital. It permits payments 
to be spread out over a number of years after which time 
the government owns the building. It allows the government 
to get more people into Crown owned buildings by enabling 
the government to build a larger number of buildings in a 
shorter period of time. The economics of this type of 
contract means that the government pays more in the long run 
than if it had purchased the building outright. However, 
the extra payments must be considered in terms of opportunity 
cost. The government has to lease buildings regardless. 
Lease purchase offers the added incentive of being able to 
buy the building. An example of such an agreement is the 
Terrasses de la Chaudi~re complex in Hull. 130 The government 
130 
Maurice Cutler, "Ottawa's Projects: Federal 
spending called 'largest realty operation'," in Financial 
Post, May 15, 1976, p. S5. 
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will lease three office towers (1.8 million square feet), 
for approximately 14 million dollars a year over a 35 year 
period. This amounts to a cost of $480 million over the life 
of the contract with an option to buy the complex at the 
end of the lease for $54 million. This compares to a 
construction cost of $164 million as estimated by the 
contractor. As mentioned in Chapter V, the cost of this 
agreement is cause for concern. 
Revenue contracting includes both the sale of goods, 
which is the responsibility of Crown Assets Disposal 
Corporation, and the sale of services. The sale of services, 
in the form of leases and concessions, is a major revenue 
area. The Department of Public Works is constantly under 
pressure to lease commercial space in its office buildings. 
The same is true of the Ministry of Transport with regard to 
airport concessions. This latter area has recently been the 
subject of some controversy in the Sky shops affair. 
Government contracts include many special features. 
Most notably they tend to include fixed time and unit price 
rates as a breakdown of cost. This provides the government 
with a basis on which to negotiate and control cost increases 
associated with change orders and additional work. Another 
feature of a government contract is that it is always a 
contract for work, not people. This allows the government 
to avoid entering into an employer-employee relationship and 
the perils, such as the cost of strikes, associated with it. 
Various conditions are also applied to government 
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contracts. Frequently the text of a contract makes reference 
to its being subject to certain acts of Parliament. For 
example, defence contracts make reference to the fact that 
they are subject to the Defence Production Act. And 
Section 19 of that Act states: 
(1) A person who has entered into a 
defence contract shall keep detailed 
accounts and records of the cost of 
carrying out the contract and shall, 
on demand, produce to any person 
thereunto authorized by the Minister 
every account, record or document of 
any description with respect to the 
contract and with respect to his 
other business that may be required 
by the person so authorized and shall 
permit him to examine, audit and take 
copies of and abstracts from the 
accounts, records and documents. 
(2) Where the Minister is satisfied, 
either before or after the performance, 
in whole or in part, of a defence 
contract entered into after the 1st 
day of April 1951, that the total 
amount paid or payable thereunder 
to any person is in excess of the 
fair and reasonable cost of 
performing the contract together 
with a fair and reasonable profit, 
he may by order reduce the amount 
that such person is entitled to 
retain or receive thereunder to 
such amount as he may fix as the 
fair and reasonable cost of 
performing the contract together 
with a fair and reasonable profit 
thereon and the Minister may direct 
that person to pay to the Receiver 
General forthwith any amount that such 
person has received under the contract 
in excess of the amount so fixed. 131 
1310ffice consolidation, Defence Production Act, 
R.S., c.62, S.l. 
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The provision of such a discretionary audit is not as 
effective a method of control as might be imagined. The 
cost of such an audit is about $2,000. Hence, only 
larger contracts tend to be audited. And when such audits 
have been undertaken, they have usually resulted in added 
awards to the contractor. 132 
Negotiated contracts usually contain a provision 
stipulating a maximum profit ceiling to which the contractor 
is subject. 133 The Department of Supply and Services 
usually allows 10 to 11% on negotiated fixed fee contracts 
and 3 to 6% on the less desirable cost plus fixed fee 
contracts. On those occasions when the profit ceiling has 
been exceeded by a few percentage points, say 15 instead of 
134 11%, the department usually tends to look the other way. 
However, the department can ask for a negotiated refund of 
excess profit, that is profit which is in excess of that 
which is fair and reasonable or that which is stipulated 
in the contract. 
One of the biggest problems in contractual arrange-
ments is cost escalation. In order to provide itself with 
maximum protection the government has, whenever possible, 
tended toward firm price contracts. However, this is not 
13~ f'd' 1 1976 Source con ~ ent~a , Ottawa, August, • 
133 . . ... 11 In compet~t~ve contracts, compet~t~on ~s genera y 
thought to keep profit to a reasonable level. 
134 
Source confidential, Ottawa, March, 1977. 
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always possible. Consequently, the government has introduced 
certain contracting practices that afford the Crown increased 
protection. For instance, the Department of Supply and 
Services operates on the premise that escalation clauses 
should not be considered if the delivery period of a contract 
is less than six months. Furthermore, the department has 
defined three standards when dealing with escalation: 
1) escalation clauses should not give a one-sided advantage. 
Therefore if costs go down the government should benefit. 
2) escalation clauses should have a ceiling. 
3) escalation clauses lower contractors' risks and thus a 
lower profit level and associated price would be appropriate. 
Thus, the government position allows the contractor to apply 
escalation clauses only to those price elements where 
available information is inadequate to predict the amount 
f 1 t ' 135 o esca a 1on. 
Construction contracts seem to produce relatively 
few problems of a contractual nature and seem to afford a 
maximum of protection to the Crown. Since 1963 there has 
existed a standard federal construction contract which has 
been continually refined over the years. All the departments 
engaging in major construction activity, such as the 
Department of Transport, the Department of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development and Defence Construction (1951) 
135 
The government has made provision in firm and 
ceiling price contracts for price adjustments in the event 
of changes in federal taxes after the date of the contract. 
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Ltd., use it. Its effectiveness may be illustrated by 
example. On all tenders the Department of Public Works 
asks the contractor to list all non-Canadian items. The 
department also asks what the price difference would be to 
replace foreign bought materials with comparable Canadian 
items. A contractor on the West Coast failed to indicate 
in his contract that he would be using Japanese steel in 
his construction project. The Department of Public ~·Jorks 
held him accountable for his mistake despite the financial 
136 hardship he would be forced to face. 
Thus, the provisions of a contract can provide the 
government with a good deal of cost control. However, this 
is not always the case. For instance, in 1976 the Canadian 
government entered into a contract with a West German company 
for the purchase of Leopard tanks. A Canadian government 
statement concerning the agreement reads: 
The recent purchase of Leopard tanks 
has resulted in a contractual 
commitment on the part of Krauss-
Maffei Aktiengesellschaft (KM) 
• . • to purchase $60 million 
worth of Canadian goods during the 
next 10 years. The products are 
to be fully manufactured items 
of high technology and of high 
Canadian content. The product 
range is not dependent on Krauss-
Maffei's own manufacturing 
interests but the agreement allows 
related by Mr. J. C. Morin, Contract Policy 
and Administration, Department of Public Works, Government 
of Canada, Ottawa, July, 1976. 
Krauss-Maffei to influence any 
German company to purchase on 
their behalf. l37 
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The important point to note concerning the agreement is that 
it does not guarantee $60 million worth of new business 
opportunities for Canadian manufacturers. Under the terms 
of the contract, Krauss-Maffei can influence any German 
company to purchase on its behalf, even if that company 
would normally have planned to purchase goods in Canada. 
The net effect of the contract, in contrast to its 
objectives, may be to decrease intended sales of Canadian 
manufactured goods abroad. 
In summary, administrative controls over government 
contracting tend to focus on the problems of equity and 
best value. Equity, expressed in terms of fair administrative 
practices and procedures, is attained by the centralization 
of the procurement function in common service departments. 
The existence of policy review groups and the development of 
expertise within such departments contribute to their ability 
to advance the objective of equity, as well as deal with 
the important problem of cost control. The effectiveness 
of these departments is limited in several respects. In 
goods procurement, the Department of Supply and Services has 
no control over needs definition and single source requisitions. 
And in construction contracting, departments are not obligated 
l3'SUpply and Services Canada, WeekI, Bulletin of 
Business Opportunities, Vol. 3 (1976), No.4, attached 
supplement re: Leopard Tanks Purchase. 
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to use the services of the Department of Public Works, unless 
their project exceeds their level of contractual authority. 
The major focus of administrative control is directed 
at the problem of cost control. This problem is addressed 
by defining levels of authority with respect to cost 
approval and by introducing cost control features within 
the contractual document. The effectiveness of levels of 
authority as a cost control mechanism is hindered by a lack 
of discretionary authority and by a general reluctance on 
the part of many civil servants to challenge the government 
on this point. The contractual document, on the other hand, 
tends to be a relatively effective cost control mechanism. 
The nature, terms and conditions of a contract contribute to 
cost reduction by such means as keeping profits to reasonable 
levels and transferring risks to the contractor. Another 
method of cost control are cost breakdowns, which provide 
the government with a basis on which to price additional work. 
A major drawback with regard to the effectiveness of the 
contractual dbcument as a cost control mechanism is the 
existence of the lease purchase type of agreement. Although 
expedient, such agreements tend to commit the government to 
expenditures far into the future, and may often not be 
justified in terms of opportunity costs. 
The problem of socio-economic goals which are 
incompatible with traditional procurement standards was 
also considered in the context of promoting Canadian content 
in goods and construction procurement. In this regard, it 
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was noted that the control mechanisms concerned contributed 
to rather than helped alleviate the problem. 
Consideration should be given to the following 
recommendations as means by which the effectiveness of 
administrative control over government contracting could 
be increased: 
1) the impact of government reorganizations on key procurement 
personnel should be assessed in order to avoid a serious 
drain on experienced manpower, as occurred in the 
Department of Public Works; 
2) the Department of Supply and Services should require 
justifications for all single source requisitions made 
by customer departments; 
3) the exercise of discretionary authority should be 
encouraged in those situations where its use is 
warranted; and 
4) the utility of the lease purchase agreement should be 
re-evaluated in terms of its cost effectiveness in 
meeting government needs. 
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CHAPTER VII 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL FORMS OF CONTROL 
This chapter examines the legal parameters within 
which government contracting takes place. This includes a 
consideration of two control mechanisms, statutory law and 
the courts. The former will be considered in terms of the 
sort of contractual problems it is designed to prevent, 
the latter in terms of the problems with which it deals. 
Perhaps the most penetrating and all encompassing 
control over government contracting is that of statutory 
law. Its importance stems from the fact that the public 
servant can only do that which is authorized by law, as 
opposed to doing all except what is prohibited by law. This 
distinction and the existence of provisions within a contract 
making it subject to certain Acts of Parliament are the 
central elements necessary to an understanding of its 
importance in dealing with such contractual problems as 
cost control, financial mismanagement, graft and the 
maintenance of equitable administrative practices and 
procedures. In this regard, statutory law can be seen 
as both a guide and as a deterrent. 
An important statute addressing the problem of cost 
control is the Defence Production Act (1951). Section 19 of 
the Act allows the government to audit a defence contractor. 
A departmental document interpreting this section of the 
Act states: 
Section 19 requires a defence 
contractor to keep proper accounts 
and cost records, and to make them 
available to the Minister or his 
delegate. Subsections 2 to 5 empower 
the Minister to reassess contract 
costs and profits when he thinks them 
unreasonably high, and to reduce 
contract costs and profits. If the 
contractor's records seem unsatis-
factory i~~ Minister is not bound 
by them. 
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At first glance Section 19 seems to offer itself as a valuable 
means with which to control costs in defence contracting. 
However, it is often difficult to enforce with respect to 
foreign defence suppliers as they are not subject to 
Canadian laws. 
The most noteworthy statute governing contractual 
affairs is the Financial Administration Act. Section 27 of 
this Act deals with financial management in contractual 
affairs. It states that no payment shall be made by the 
government without certificate from the department that: 
a) work has been performed, the 
goods supplied or the service 
rendered, as the case may be, 
and that the price charged is 
according to the contract, or if 
not specified by the contract is 
reasonable; or 
b) where payment is to be made before 
the completion of the work, delivery 
of the goods or rendering of the 
service, as the case may be, that 
138 f'd 'I d bl' h d 'I Al Con 1 ent1a an unpu 1S e mater1a. so 
see the Act. 
the payment is in y~~ordance 
with the contract. 
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Sectiqn 33 of the Financial Administration Act places the 
government under further limitations with regard to the 
financial management of government procurement. This 
section states that: 
it is a term of every contract 
providing for the payment of any 
money by Her Majesty that payment 
thereunder is subject to there 
being an appropriation for the 
particular service for the fiscal 
year in which any commitment 
thereunder would c~mg in the 
course of payment. 4 
Contracts must thus conform to the budgetary restrictions 
to which they are subject. 
The limitations placed on financial management in 
government contracting provide a broad basis for control. 
However, this is not to say that the provisions of 
statutory law are not violated. The Lockheed Orion deal 
serves to illustrate this point. The Department of National 
Defence had initially committed itself to payments under 
contract for which there was no appropriation. Rather than 
being seen as a violation requiring disciplinary action, 
the Lockheed deal was treated by the press and the opposition 
parties as just another government blunder. Although 
ministers and civil servants alike were to blame for the 
139 Government of Canada, Revised Statutes of Canada, 
1970, c. F-10, 5-27. 
140 b'd !-L., S. 33. 
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Lockheed situation, it was the government ministers who had 
to take the flack. And in the interest of political 
survival, they found it necessary to make the claim of no 
wrong doing on their part. 
Other contractual problems addressed by statutory 
law are graft and the maintenance of equitable administrative 
practices and procedures. Section 92 of the Financial 
Administration Act and sections of the Criminal Code of 
Canada have provisions relating to the breach of laws or 
regulations in the area of government contracting. The 
contractual regulations referred to involve such things as 
conflicts of interest and are designed to help maintain 
equitable contractual practices and procedures. Of course, 
in order to apply these laws and regulations, one must 
first be able to establish that an offence has taken place. 
This is no easy matter, for laws will remain ineffective 
unless charges are laid. And who is to lay the charges? 
A civil servant may not want to jeopardize his position and 
hopes for promotion by revealing breaches of law within the 
branch of government for which he is responsible. Government 
leaders also find it in their interests to avoid scandal. 
Statutory law is thus a major determinant of the pro-
cedures and substance of government contracting. It is a 
valuable guide with respect to matters of cost control and 
financial management. It also provides a deterrent against 
graft by providing for punishment of criminal activity in the 
contractual affairs of government. In the latter instance, 
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its effectiveness as a control over government contracting 
tends to be limited, inasmuch as enforcement seems to be 
lacking. 
Statutory law is a preventive control. It provides 
a guide or restraint with regard to improper contractual 
activity. The courts, on the other hand, exercise a reactive 
as opposed to a preventive control. More specifically, they 
are responsible for the adjudication of claims in the area of 
administrative law. In this capacity, they provide judgements 
on already existing contractual problems. 14l The problems 
most commonly considered by the courts are those of cost 
recovery, financial mismanagement, graft and the maintenance 
of equitable practices and procedures. The last problem is 
most often examined in reference to contract interpretation 
and appeals against subordinate legislation. 
Judicial decisions concerning government contracting 
tend to centre around three factors. These are the 
contractual document, the conduct of those involved with 
it and the authority underlying it. 
The provisions of a contract appear to be the 
element most often under judicial review. Indeed, only in 
a court of law do the provisions of a contractual agreement 
become enforceable. The government or a contractor may file 
a claim for redress of grievances against the offending party 
should be noted that the courts also have a 
deterrent effect. It appears to be minimal but this is 
difficult to determine. 
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of a contract. This may entail the demand for compensation 
or the imposition of a penalty on a party who has not properly 
fulfilled the provisions of the contract in the ways outlined 
by the contract. An example142 of such a case is the claim 
by Her Majesty against Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd. and Chemi-
Solv Ltd. filed on August 20, 1975. The claim came about as 
a result of corrosive damages sustained during the chemical 
cleaning of the port and starboard main boilers of H.M.C.S. 
Restigouche. The government's claim for damages, which 
included the cost of investigation, repair of corrosion 
damage and loss of the use of the vessel totalled $721,468.26. 
The Deputy Attorney General of Canada, acting for the plain-
tiff, also sought to recover the costs of the court action 
and any other relief deemed just by the court. 
The courts, by providing compensation and aiding in 
the recovery of costs, help the government ensure that the 
objective of obtaining fair value for the taxpayer's dollar 
is met. However, it should be noted that the process works 
both ways. Contractors can also sue the government and its 
agents. And insofar as they are successful in such suits, 
the attainment of the objective of best value is compromised. 
The courts also play an important role with regard 
to the interpretation of the provisions of a contract. This 
142The example is based upon a statement of claim 
and supporting documents filed on Aug. 20/75 between Her 
Majesty the Queen in the Right of Canada (Plaintiff) and 
Hawker Sidde1ey Canada Ltd. and Chemi-So1v Ltd. in the 
Federal Court of Canada (Trial Division). 
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is to say that the courts decide whether the provisions of 
a contract have been lived up to when any ambiguity exists 
with respect to its interpretation. A good illustration of 
such a situation is cited in the United States Contract 
Appeal Decisions: 
A dam construction contractor was 
entitled to additional compensation 
for bringing sand to the worksite 
from downstream because the 
government's refusal to allow him 
to take sand from the area designated 
in the contract unless he backfilled 
and restored it to its original 
conditions was not economically 
feasible and constituted a change. 
The contract required only that the 
borrow area be "restored to a 
condition after completion of 
construction that will appear 
natural and not detract from the 
appearance of the project." The 
contractor's plan to make the 
borrow area into a lake was in 
accordance with this instruction; 
the government's interpretation 
of "restore" to require restoration 143 
to its original condition was a change. 
By favouring the contractor, this decision implied government 
mismanagement inasmuch as the government did not get what it 
wanted. It should also be noted that the imposition of 
unreasonable demands upon a contractor as a result of 
provisions within a contract, constitute grounds for 
challenging the validity of that contract. 144 
143Board of Contract Appeals Decisions (New York: 
Commerce Clearing House, 1976), pp. 56,901-56,902. 
144 ° d "b dO ° 1 ° ,,0 E. A. Dr1e ger, Su or 1nate Leg1s at1on, 1n 
A. M. Willms and W. D. K. Kernaghan, Public Administration 
in Canada: Selected Readings, 1st Edition (Toronto: Methuen, 
1968), pp. 416-417. 
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second category of judicial decisions to be 
discus are those relating to the conduct of government 
contracting ~ These decisions -tend to deal with the problem 
of graft and are concerned with the maintenance of equity 
in the procurement process. l!'or instance i the government IS 
conduct with respect to contracting is subject to its 
. . d f . h . .. 145 exerc~s~ng goo a1t 1n carry~ng out ~ts statutory powers. 
These powers must be used in accordance \vi th the purposes 
which they are given. "A court of law may intervene if 
powers entrusted for one purpose are deliberately used with 
the design of achieving another, itself unauthorized or 
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actually forbidden." The authority of the courts extends 
to the prosecution of any criminal conduct undertaken by 
the government and its agents and/or the contractor. 
Provisions relating to such conduct are contained in the 
Criminal Code of Canada, to which reference was made in 
earlier chapters. 
The third and final category of judicial decisions 
to be discussed are those in which contractual authority is 
challenged. A government contract may be challenged on 
grounds that the authority conferred by an Act has been 
It is interesting to note that the government 
sometimes has a decided advantage in a court of law. Where 
Parliament has given a Minister discretionary power the courts 
cannot interfere with the exercise of that discretion. This 
advantage can serve to place the government in a better 
position than the contractor or supplier in the event of a 
legal dispute. 
146 
Driedger, "Subordinate Legislation," p. 416. 
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exceeded or the Act itself is ultra vires with respect to 
the British North America Act. Included in most government 
contracts is a provision allowing the Governor-in-Council 
to make regulations with respect to that contract. It reads 
to the effect that: 
The Governor-in-Council may make 
regulations as he deems necessary 
for carrying out the purpose 
and provisions of a given Act. 
Subordinate legislation enacted in the form of regulations 
is considered to constitute law. It can be challenged on 
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several grounds. These include: 
1) the repeal of the authorizing act; 
2) the authorizing act being found ultra vires; 
3) the improper delegation of contractual authority; and 
4) the failure to comply with necessary conditions 
established in the authorizing statute. 148 
When considering appeals against subordinate 
legislation, the courts frequently consider the problem of 
maintaining equitable administrative practices and procedures. 
In this regard, they can remedy a specific situation, while 
indicating to the government that a problem exists. The 
government is then free to take any corrective action it 
deems necessary to avert a repetition of such a situation 
147 
It would appear that such subordinate legislation 
is seldom challenged. This assertion is based on a review 
of Dominion Law Reports for the period 1969 to 1976. 
l48Driedger, "Subordinate Legislation," pp. 411-427. 
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in the future. 
The courts are a meaningful control over government 
contracting, but their effectiveness is subject to some 
limitation. This is to say that the judicial process works 
both ways and legal claims are often made against the 
149 government. Another limitation relates to the difficulties 
in uncovering, let alone prosecuting, contractual activities 
involving graft. It should also be noted that not all 
t t 1 bl bl 1 1 d ' d' , 150 con rac ua pro ems are amena e to ega a JU 1cat10n. 
In this regard, judicial review should be seen as only one 
of many mechanisms by which control can be exercised over 
the contractual affairs of government. 
149An example of a claim against the government held 
for the plaintiff is The Queen v. Transworld Shipping Ltd. 
This case involved the Department of Transport's repudiation 
of a contract governing the charter of a vessel. The tender 
originally called for a 'commonwealth flag' vessel. The firm 
in question complied with this condition. The Crown later 
amended the requirements so as to allow only 'Canadian flag' 
vessels. Transworld Shipping Ltd. was subsequently awarded 
$110,124.24 in the Federal Court (Trial Division) and this 
judgement was upheld in the Federal Court of Appeals. 
See - The Queen v. Transworld Shipping Ltd., Federal Court 
of Appeals, June 30, 1975, 61 D.L.R. (3d), 1976, pp. 304-316. 
150contractual problems are sometimes settled out of 
court by agreement of the parties concerned. An example of 
such a case is the claim of Northrop Corp. that Her Majesty 
failed to abide by a license agreement governing the Northrop 
F-5A and B aircraft. The sale of these aircraft to Venezuela 
in December, 1973 constituted a breach of the agreement. 
Northrop accepted the Crown's offer of compensation. The case 
had an unusual twist in that both parties went to court 
seeking a judgement on the agreement, so that they need not 
wait for Parliament to appropriate the monies. The case was 
dismissed in the end. See - Northrop Corp. v. The Queen 
et al., Federal Court (Trial Division), July 14, 1976, 
68 D.L.R. (3d), 1976, pp. 182-187. 
120 
To conclude: both statutory law and judicial review 
help advance the objectives of equity and best value. 
However, their emphasis differs. Statutory law is a 
preventive control. Judicial review deals with already 
existing contractual problems, and in this capacity acts 
as a reactive control. The former is designed to act as a 
guide in matters of cost control and financial management. 
The latter applies remedies to the problems of cost recovery 
and financial mismanagement. In this regard, it should be 
noted that the government is not always the claimant. 
Statutory law also acts as a deterrent with respect 
to avoiding graft. Judicial review, on the other hand, 
exacts punishment for such activity. Both deal with the 
problem of maintaining equitable contractual practices and 
procedures. The former does so by defining such things as 
conflicts of interest, and the latter by dealing with 
contractual interpretation and appeals against subordinate 
legislation. 
The effectiveness of judicial review as a control 
over government contracting is largely dependent on how 
often the government or its contractors bring cases to 
court. As an enforcement agency, the courts depend on 
others to uncover contractual problems and initiate legal 
action. Unfortunately, these other sources and control 
mechanisms are often ineffective in uncovering such problems, 
as is evidenced by the length of time dredging fraud went 
unnoticed. This lack of enforcement by the courts adversely 
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affects the deterrent capabilities of statutory law. If 
few prosecutions of graft are initiated, or if sentences 
are light, the credibility of statutory law as a deterrent 
is weakened. It would therefore seem imperative that the 
government make increased efforts to bring to trial those 
individuals who have undermined the justice of the 
procurement system by engaging in graft. 
PART III 
CONCLUSION 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
The subject of this thesis was an examination of 
political and administrative control over federal government 
contracting in Canada. The major argument was that 
political and administrative control over government 
contracting was inadequate to achieve certain principles 
relating to the conduct of governmental affairs. These 
principles were that: 
1) the government should obtain fair value for the taxpayer's 
dollar; 
2) the government should be equitable in the dispensation of 
public funds; and 
3) the government should, when appropriate, relate its 
procurement activities to national policies and objectives. 
This study also undertook an examination of certain contractual 
problems impeding the exercise of control, as well as an 
examination of those factors which impaired or negated the 
effectiveness of the various sources of control. In 
addition, it endeavoured to state how control over government 
contracting might be improved. 
The major problems that were identified as 
impediments to the exercise of control over government 
contracting included: 
1} cost control; 
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2) the maintenance of fairness and justice in the procurement 
process; and 
3) the introduction of socio-economic goals which are 
incompatible with traditional procurement standards. 
These problems were seen to hinder the attainment of the 
objectives of control and thereby to obstruct the exercise of 
effective control by the departments and agencies concerned. 
Four types of cost control problems were identified 
and discussed in relation to the sources of control. These 
included needs definition, the use of the common service, as 
opposed to the private distribution system, cost recovery 
and financial mismanagement. 
The problem of needs definition was originally defined 
as a common service-customer department relations problem 
involving the submission of specific as opposed to performance 
specifications. In this regard it was noted that common 
service departments exercise little, if any, control over 
single source requisitions. The only control mechanisms to 
address this problem are the estimates, Cabinet and the 
Treasury Board Secretariat. And they tend to examine it 
indirectly, in terms of a budgetary review of expenditures. 
Even in this regard, their effectiveness appears limited. 
Questionable expenditures are often placed in the final 
supplementary estimates and hurriedly passed through an i1l-
attended House near the end of a session. Cabinet is 
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congested with contractual business and its members subject 
to numerous time constraints. And the effectiveness of the 
Treasury Board Secretariat appears to be limited by the 
sheer size of government. 
The second type of cost control problem involved the 
use of common service departments rather than the parallel 
private distribution system in meeting government procurement 
needs. This problem was considered in the section dealing 
with levels of authority. More specifically, it was 
examined in relation to those conditions under which the 
Department of Supply and Services encourages departments to 
contract directly. 
The third problem, cost recovery, was a matter of 
concern to several control mechanisms including the Auditor 
General, statutory law and the courts. The Auditor General 
is perhaps the most effective of these controls inasmuch as 
he provides an organized and systematic consideration of 
the financial affairs of government. In this capacity, he 
gives the government an opportunity to recover misappropriated 
funds. Statutory law also deals with the problem of cost 
recovery. In this regard, it was noted that the Defence 
Production Act allowed the government to audit a defence 
contractor and reduce any costs or profits considered by 
the Minister to be too high. The control afforded by 
statutory law thus proved to be limited in that such 
provisions applied only to defence contracts. The ability 
of the courts to deal with this problem is also restricted 
in that they have to depend on other control mechanisms 
to uncover such situations as '\rifell as 
proceedings to recover expenditures. 
ate legal 
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Financial mismanagement was the fourth cost control 
problem considered. The control mechanisms involved with 
this problem are of two sorts, preventive and reactive. 
The preventive control mechanisms include statutory 
law and administrative controls. Statutory 1a\'\7 provides a 
valuable guide in matters of financial management. To this 
end, it institutes financial restraints that require all 
expenditures to be properly vouched and certified before 
payment. The administrative controls concerned with financial 
management include the expertise and review functions of common 
service departments, the determination of levels of authority 
with respect to cost approval, and cost control features 
within the contractual document. In the latter two instances, 
the ability of the control mechanisms to deal with this 
problem is limited by a lack of discretionary authority 
and by the existence of the lease purchase contract. 
The reactive control mechanisms relevant to the 
problem of financial mismanagement are numerous. They 
include question period and debate, and Public Accounts 
Committee, the Auditor General, the Prime Minister, the 
Treasury Board Secretariat and the courts. Question period 
and debate tend to focus on sensational situations which 
could afford the opposition political benefit. This control 
tends to expound upon, rather than help uncover, instances 
of financial mismanagement. 
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The Public Accounts Committee and the Auditor General 
both concentrate on the problem of non-productive payments, 
wherein they question whether value for money is received. 
The effectiveness of the Public Accounts Committee is limited 
by a lack of expertise and by a lack of research staff. And 
the Auditor General's effectiveness is impaired by his 
failure to present to the bureaucracy an ever-looming and 
menacing presence. 
The efforts of the Prime .f<1inister with respect to 
the problem of financial mismanagement centre upon his ability 
to mediate departmental disputes in the procurement area. 
The Treasury Board Secretariat is another executive control 
mechanism that is concerned with such problems. However, 
its effectiveness is limited by the fact that it rarely 
becomes aware of contractual matters that fall below a 
department's contract approval ceiling. The courts also 
deal with problems of financial mismanagement. They give 
the government an opportunity to claim damages and thereby 
to recoup losses incurred as a result of a contractor's 
mismanagement in the fulfillment of a contract. In this 
regard, it was noted that the process works both ways. A 
contractor can also sue the government for damages on the 
same grounds. 
The problem of cost control is dealt with by 
various control mechanisms of varying abilities. Some 
problems are given little attention, others a great deal. 
Among those which are given insufficient or no attention 
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are the problems of needs definition and the use of the 
common service, as opposed to the private distribution 
system. The problem of cost recovery is handled by a 
number of control mechanisms, but they are subject to 
various limitations. Only the Auditor General is an 
effective control with regard to cost recovery, and even 
his efforts are restricted by the sheer size of government. 
This study gave extensive consideration to the 
problem of financial mismanagement. Both preventive and 
reactive control mechanisms were considered in the context 
of this problem. Their ability to deal with such situations 
is effective in many instances, but nevertheless limited, 
as evidenced by the number of cases of financial mismanage-
ment that occur and the length of time they go undetected. 
In summary, the ability of the various sources of control 
to deal effectively with cost control problems and thereby 
contribute toward the attainment of the objective of best 
value was seen to be limited. 
The second major problem considered was that of 
maintaining fairness and justice in the procurement process. 
This involves not only preventing graft, but maintaining 
equitable administrative practices and procedures. 
The problem of graft was dealt with by several control 
mechanisms including question period and debate, the Public 
Accounts Committee, the Treasury Board Secretariat, statutory 
law and the courts. Question period and debate often focus 
on this problem, inasmuch as they provide the opposition with 
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opportunities to embarrass the government. This control 
mechanism is effective as an opportunity to expand upon 
occurrences of graft, but is not so effective at uncovering 
them. The Public Accounts Committee also deals with the 
problem of graft. However, its activities in this area are 
extremely limited. Indeed, the only notable investigation 
carried out by the Committee in regard to graft was the 
inquiry into the nuclear reactor affair. 
The Treasury Board Secretariat is a relatively 
effective control mechanism in dealing with the problem of 
graft. It has developed conflict of interest guidelines 
directed at preventing the occurrence of such activity and 
has undertaken studies of specific situations, such as 
dredging fraud, in order that it might prevent future abuses 
in the procurement process. However, the effectiveness of 
the Treasury Board Secretariat is limited by virtue of the 
fact that it is unable to oversee a great deal of the 
contractual activity undertaken by government. 
Another control mechanism that deals with the 
problem of graft is statutory law. Its effectiveness 
stems from its ability to act as a deterrent. And if its 
deterrent capability is not sufficient, the courts provide 
the means by which to administer punishment. However, the 
effectiveness of these controls is impaired by a lack of 
enforcement. Without adequate enforcement the courts are 
unable to fulfill their punitive function and statutory law 
is deprived of some of its credibility. 
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The objective of promoting equity in the procurement 
process was also examined in terms of the problem of 
maintaining equitable administrative practices and procedures. 
The control mechanisms which addressed this problem include 
individual ministers, the Treasury Board Secretariat, common 
service departments and the courts. 
In Chapter 6, the contribution of individual ministers 
to the objective of equity was examined. The specific case 
involved the Minister of Supply and Services and his decision 
not to grant special status to a large electronics manufacturer, 
thereby upholding the objective of equity. Such cases are 
rare, however, in that ministers seldom become directly 
involved with maintaining equitable administrative practices 
and procedures. 
The Treasury Board Interdepartmental Committee on 
Contracts was also seen to exercise significant control with 
respect to this problem. It did so by examining contractual 
policies and procedures and making recommendations thereon. 
Common service departments were also viewed as an effective 
control mechanism in this respect. They exercise control by 
means of policy review groups and centralized expertise. 
However, frequent staff turnovers, particularly in the 
Department of Public Works, impair their ability to deal 
with this problem. 
The courts were another means of control with 
respect to equity. They exercise control through contract 
interpretation and through a consideration of appeals 
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against subordinate legislation. In this capacity, they 
are able to remedy a specific problem, as well as indicate 
to the government that it exists. '1'he effectiveness of this 
control mechanism is dependent, however, on such cases 
being brought to trial. 
various control mechanisms have proved to be 
fairly effective in dealing with the problem of maintaining 
fairness and justice in the procurement system. 
The third and final problem examined was that of 
·the introduction of socia-economic goals which were incom-
patible with the procurement function of government. Such 
socia-economic goals were seen to be inconsistent with the 
objectives of equity and best value. The most important 
control mechanism with regard to this problem is Cabinet, 
inasmuch as it is the primary source of the problem. This 
is the case insofar as Cabinet is responsible for issuing 
socio-economic directives which are often incompatible with 
the objectives of equity and best value. In this regard, 
it was suggested that Cabinet not needlessly undermine 
the objectives of control, when other means to promote socio-
economic goals are available and feasible. The other control 
mechanisms addressing this problem were the estimates and 
the Treasury Board Secretariat. They did so in terms of 
relating socio-economic goals and government priorities to 
procurement needs. In this context, they advanced socio-
economic goals which were consistent with the procurement 
function of govennment. 
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Improving control over government contracting is no 
easy matter. In the preceding chapters, some suggestions 
for improvements have been made. Hm-lever, there exist many 
more problems and many more approaches with \'lhich to solve 
them. The procurement process 1 probably never reach 
anything near perfection. But when one considers how many 
problems exist and how much more room there is for improve-
ment, the exercise of control over government contracting 
does not seem adequate. The major objectives of control, 
equity, best value and the introduction of socio-economic 
goals consistent with the procurement function have all too 
often been frustrated and undermined. There just seem to 
be too many problems, too few solutions and too few effective 
sources of control to maintain that the exercise of political 
and administrative control over government contracting is 
adequate .. 
This conclusion is particularly important in the 
light of the Auditor General's recent statement that the 
government has almost lost control over the public purse. 
After all, expenditures for government contracting are an 
important part of total government expenditure. It would be 
useful therefore, if the Royal Commission which has been 
established to examine government control of expenditure 
would explore the extent to which more effective control 
over government contracting could be achieved. 
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